

***INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS BETWEEN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES IN FOSTERING SUSTAINABLE URBAN
DEVELOPMENT IN TANZANIA***

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Abstract

Tanzania in embarking the decentralization by devolution policy (D by D) as a mechanism of facilitating quick development process through the involvement of people from grass root levels has been carried out through the inter-government relations between the central government and the local government authorities (LGAs). Throughout its implementation there had been a supportive structural set up, including a constitutional mandate for local governments. Also there has been an increased recognition of LGAs by central and sector ministries as partners rather than subordinate structures. On the other hand, line ministries are significantly fulfilling their policy-making role, making regulations, monitoring performance and capacity enhancement in LGAs. The presence of a ministry responsible for local government (PO RALG), to coordinate and harmonise central-local relations, has also contributed to improved relations between and among parties involved. Moreover, the lack of a clear and effective institutional framework to govern the implementation of D by D and the lack of a shared understanding of D by D across ministries and other governmental institutions. Thus, this paper calls for formulation of a comprehensive National Decentralisation Policy with its implementation strategy so as to spearhead the decentralisation agenda in the country in a holistic way.

Key words: *Decentralisation, central – local relations and governance.*

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Achieving sustainable development for a developing country like Tanzania, there is a need of having a system that incorporates efforts of all parties and actors on board including, the government (central government and local government authorities), local communities (individuals, Civil Society Organisations), Political Parties, Private Sector, and Development Partners.

Venugopal and. Yilmaz (2010) stipulated that local governments in Tanzania were firstly introduced in 1926 in the then Tanganyika territory by the colonial British. However, after the country gained its independence, there are had been several phases with regards to decentralisation in the country. As elaborated by Mwaikusa (1996), the establishing, abolishing and re-establishing of local governments in Tanzania had been done not due to tangible locals' demands, instead as a result of some desires from the centre.

Ten years since the abolishing local governments, the government made an important decision of re-establishing them again in the year 1982 (Anosisye, 2017). The central focus, among other things, was to give the powers to local communities to determine their own development (Ngware and Haule 1992:9). This followed by series of measures in order to enhance the capacity of these local governments in provision of services required by the local communities within their areas of jurisdiction (URT, 2008). It is during this final phase whereby the government's reforms focused on promotion of decentralisation by devolution (Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2010). The current existing local government framework is a result of local government reform agenda (URT, 1996) and the policy paper on local government reform (URT, 1998). The decentralisation by devolution (D by D) has been facilitated by the local government reforms programme (LGRP) that started to be implemented since 1999.

The prevailing situation depicts that the central government sets policy frameworks for local government authorities to implement in terms of National development plans, including budget guidelines and disbursements after the budget has been approved by the Parliament; as well as

sectorial policies that touch everyday life of the community at large. Additionally, based on the government structure with reference to the Constitution of Tanzania, the ruling party through its election manifesto has a mandate to enforce the course of actions not only at central level but also up to grass root levels, which are under the mandate of LGAs. With the presence of multiparty democracy, these LGAs are now under the leadership of different political parties.

Harnessing the capacities of Local Government Authorities (LGAs) especially city/municipal councils, civil society organizations (CSOs) and the private sector by the central government can pave the way for delivering better sustainable urban development in Tanzania (Worrall et al., 2017). As it has been elucidated by Worrall et al., (2017), providing opportunities for local community participation and oversight can give to room for curbing deficits in urban governance, including poor policy coordination and lack of technical capabilities. Rashid, et al., (2009) expounded that urban governance is an integration of effort between the local community, private sector and local government authorities whereby, there is integrated mechanisms, processes and institutions, through which citizens and social groups state their preferences, negotiate solutions of their contradictions and utilise their constitutional rights, as well as comprehend their duties.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

This paper has been prepared based on an on-going research work titled “*Urban Governance and Politics of Inclusion in achieving Sustainable Urban Development in Tanzania*” under the PhD program at University of Perugia – Department of Political Science. The thrust is placed on one of the specific objectives, which is to analyse the integration of political ideologies into public policies and their implications on urban governance in Tanzania.

With reference to the on-going PhD project, the main objective for this paper is to attest the relationship existing between central government and local government authorities in fostering sustainable urban development in Tanzania. The specific objectives on the other hand are to:

- (i) Examine the implementation of decentralisation in Tanzania.
- (ii) Expound political-will in central-local relations in the course of fostering sustainable urban development in Tanzania.

- (iii) Assess challenges in central-local relations with their implications in achieving sustainable urban development in Tanzania.

3.0 METHODOLOGY

This paper has been prepared by applying desk review methodology whereby all related information was in-depth reviewed, including documents and historic data. This has helped to build a good understanding of the subject matter in the country and that situation's evolution, and to uncover data gaps. Principally, systematic review approach was employed which involved exploring existing studies with attention to theoretical boundaries, units of analysis, sources of data, study contexts, and definitions and the operationalization of constructs, as well as research methods, with the goal of refining or revising existing theory as explained in depth by Durach et al., (2017). Data collection has been carried out focusing on Programme's financial and physical progress reports with regards to various projects under participating districts.

4.0 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 The Relationship Existing Between Central Government and Local Government Authorities in Fostering Sustainable Urban Development in Tanzania

4.1.1 Tanzania in a Nutshell

Tanzania which is officially known as the United Republic of Tanzania is a country of nearly 945,000 square kilometres located in the eastern part of the continent of Africa, bordering the Indian Ocean to the east; Mozambique to the south; Malawi and Zambia to the south-west; Rwanda, Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo to the west; and, Uganda and Kenya to the north. Tanzania is also home to Mount Kilimanjaro, the largest mountain in Africa at nearly 5,895 metres, as well as Lake Victoria – the largest lake in Africa and the world's second largest freshwater lake; Lake Tanganyika, the second deepest lake in the world, as well as Lake Nyasa in the south of the country (Ingham et al 2017; NBS, 2017).

Based on 2012 Population and Housing Census, Tanzania's total population was projected to be 50.1 million by June 2016, with an average annual intercensal growth rate of 2.7 (NBS, 2017). According to Ingham et al (2017), between 2010 and 2015, the population grew at an average

annual rate of 3.2% compared to the 2.7% average for Sub-Saharan Africa. As per 2012 Population and Housing Census, only 29.60% of Tanzanians live in urban areas. The country's dependency ratio for individuals aged 65 or older as per projection of 2015 was 6.2 per 100 individuals of working age (15 – 64 years old) (Ingham et al, 2017). This low elderly dependency ratio could be a function of the fact that with an average age of 17 years, Tanzania has a relatively young population with more than 50% of the population aged between 16 and 64. Alternatively, the low dependency rate could signify competition between young and old within Tanzania's economy, where about 67% of the labour force engages in agricultural production.

In 2015, United Nations (2016) stated that the average age among all countries classified in the *Human Development Report* as having “high human development” was 40 years old. Alternatively, Agyeman-Duah (2017) elucidate that the average age for Sub-Saharan Africa through the same period was just over 18 years old. With Sub-Saharan Africa's total population estimated to reach more than 1.3 billion by 2030, a relatively young population could be a source of comparative advantage to the international political economy (Agyeman-Duah, 2017). This brings to an attention that, this young generation could be a driving force in all aspects of development – economic, social, environmental, cultural, and political.

4.1.2 The Political Administration in Tanzania

According to the Constitution of Tanzania, the country is considered as a ‘democratic, secular and socialist state’.¹ Tanzania's well established stability has gone through a process of nation-building in terms of more defined sense of national identity aided by Kiswahili as national language over English and other dialects as well as singular Tanzanian identity over ethnical and religious differences. This is partly contributed by introduction of one-party system in 1965, whereby President Nyerere declared that it was system aimed at identifying the whole nation and more democratic compared to the ‘Anglo-Saxon form of democracy’, which represented disjointed communities (Nyerere 1966, Kweka 1995).

Tanzania is a democratic unitary republic with three distinctions of governments: central that is Union government; Zanzibar devolved administration and Local Government Authorities. The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977 establishes the local governments by

¹ Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, paragraph 3, section 1,

under Articles 145 and 146. Particularly, Article 145 of the Constitution stipulates that parliament will enact a law elaborating the procedure for establishing LGAs as well as spelling out their functions, responsibilities and powers.

Specific categories of local government are established by specific local governments laws of the country especially for Tanzania mainland are the Local Government (District Authorities) Act No. 7 of 1982, which provide for the establishment District Councils and Township Authorities (villages that are assuming an urban character); and the Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act No. 8 of 1982, which provide for the establishment City, Municipal and Town councils. Other important legislation includes the Local Government Finances Act 1982; the Urban Authorities (Rating) Act 1983; the Local Authorities Elections Act 1979 and the Regional Administration Act 1997. In Zanzibar, the main legislation is the Zanzibar Municipal Councils Act 1995 and the District and Town Councils Act 1995.

4.1.3 The Structure of Local Government Authorities in Tanzania

Tanzania (Zanzibar inclusive) has got 31 regions and 148 districts, which are administrative entities charged with maintaining law and order. For the Tanzania mainland, the Ministry for Regional Administration and Local Government² (MRALG) is responsible for local government in mainland Tanzania and works within the President's Office.

In Tanzania mainland there are six (6) city councils, 19 municipalities, and 23 town councils; and, 137 district councils, which are subdivided into 3,956 wards, 4,209 *mitaa*³, and 12,337 registered villages and 64,691 *vitongoji*⁴ (hamlets, the smallest unit of a village).

In Tanzanian context, there are number of democratic bodies to debate development needs within their area of jurisdiction that are below councils. In the district councils, there are *vitongoji* that comprises an elected chairperson⁵ who appoints a secretary and three further members, all of whom serve on an advisory committee. *Vitongoji* have no legislative or decision-making powers instead they operate as fora for transmitting orders from higher tier of governments to the

² www.tamisemi.go.tz

³ *Mitaa* (plural of *mtaa*) – Swahili word stands for a small urban area or geographical division of a ward

⁴ *Vitongoji* (a plural of *kitongoji*) – Swahili word stands for hamlets, the smallest unit of a village

⁵ For the chairperson post, both men and women who are resident in the *kitongoji* and who are nominated and fully sponsored by registered political parties are allowed to contest.

community (Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2010). The main task of an elected chairperson is to mobilize residents for development, payment of taxes, and keeping records (REPOA, 2007). Decisions and proposals from this lowest level are always sent to the village executive committee which is under the leadership of the elected chairperson and a salaried public servant, that is Village Executive Officer (VEO).

On the other hand, in urban settings there is a Mtaa committees, which unlike those of the *vitongoji*, have a fully elected membership comprising a chairperson, six members and an executive officer. These committees provide a grassroots link to the ward structure, and mobilise participation of local people in local development (Lyon, Zilihona and Masanyiwa, 2018). It is within this level where the committees discuss and agreed upon priorities for service delivery and development projects and afterward the final decisions sent to the ward development committee (WDC). This is also the same with the settings in the rural authorities but done through village councils. WDC incorporates chairperson (an elected ward councillor), the ward executive officer (WEO) who is a public servant as a secretary but with no voting rights; special seat councillors⁶; all village or *mitaa* chairpersons within the ward; and, all village or *mtaa* executive officers (VEOs/MEOs). Same as what is done in sub-ward levels, the WDC is responsible for coordinating development activities, planning at the ward level and linking plans with the district level.

At the district level, the council consists of the elected ward councillors, members of the parliament (MPs) representing constituencies within the council, special seats councillors, and other MPs whose nomination originated from organs of political parties within the district council jurisdiction, and the non-voting secretary who is also District Executive Director (DED)⁷. Members of the council elect a chairperson and vice chairperson from amongst themselves. The DED is a chief executive officer as well as the accounting officer to the council.

The urban authority councils consist of members elected from the wards within them, resident MPs appointed by the President, special seat councillors, up to three members appointed by the

⁶ Special seat councilors are women representative who has been nominated by the party depending on the elections results within the constituent. At council level they are supposed to constitute about one-third of all elected councillors.

⁷ DED is a public servant appointed by the Minister responsible for Local Government.

Minister responsible for local governments, and the executive director who is the administrative head.⁸ The legislative head is the mayor elected by all council members.

All authorities (Urban and Rural) must have three standing committees: finance, administration and planning; education, health and water; and economic affairs, works and environment. Also there are statutory committees for both councils include an HIV and AIDS committee and a council ethics committee. LGAs have discretion to establish further committees, although there is a maximum for each type of authority. The role of the committees is to develop policy, set budgets and oversee the work of specific departments. Non-elected members may be co-opted onto committees depending on issues including nutrition improvement interventions and disaster management committee (Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2010).

4.1.4 Elections for Local Government Authorities

Following the introduction of multiparty politics in Tanzania in 1992 (Nzirabu, 2002), local elections alongside those of the President and Members of Parliament been conducted after every five (5) years under the supervision of the National Electoral Commission (NEC). However, for lower level of administration including the *kitongoji*, village, and *mtaa* elections are still under supervision of the ministry responsible for local governments instead of transferring the responsibility to the NEC. In addition, these lower levels' elections are always held one year before the general elections of the president, MPs and councillors.

The political representation system in Tanzania promotes upward accountability of local elected officials (Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2010). Practically, ruling party policies prevail over the preferences and priorities of the council especially those under the leadership of opposition parties, and the structure of local political decision making is determined by the ruling party caucus working at times against the priorities of the electorate (ALAT, 2004). It is from this background Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2006: p. 54) pointed out that, '...Tanzania conforms to the model that is prevalent in much of Sub-Saharan Africa: the local political organization is highly centralized with candidates for local office being nominated by national party leaders. In fact, the central political monopoly may even be more pronounced in Tanzania than elsewhere in the region.'

⁸ City council directors are appointed by the president, while directors of town and municipal councils are appointed by the minister responsible for LGA, at the moment is the President himself.

Tanzania's government has taken a legislative affirmative action to ensure women's representation in decision making structures including local government in the country. There is a legal requirement that women must occupy at least one-third of ward representatives' and 25% of village council and/or mtaa committees' seats and the prescribed special seats have increased the number of women councillors to 978 in 2015 across all authorities (Lyon, Zilihona and Masanyiwa, 2018).

4.2 Implementation of Decentralisation in Tanzania

4.2.1 Historical Background on Decentralisation

Decentralisation has a long and mixed history in Tanzania dating back to the pre-colonial times, often reflecting the prevailing national philosophy and aspirations. The colonial system of indirect rule introduced by British operated in the form of chiefdoms and sub-chiefdoms, whereby they encouraged indigenous participation in administration of the colony, albeit along tribal lines (Bates, 1962; Illife, 1979; Hartmann, 1983; Mamdani, 1992; and Gascoigne, 2011). It was during this period when a Legislative Council (popularly known as LEGCO) was established in 1926, as well as establishing Local councils and a court system as a result of the enactment of the Native Authority Ordinance of 1926 and the Native Courts Ordinance of 1929, respectively. In 1946, the Municipalities Ordinance was enacted followed by the Local Government Act in 1953 (Tordoff, 1994; Shivji and Peter, 2003).

The newly independent Tanganyika and then Tanzania, maintained and continued with the same local administrative structures that were existing during the colonial period (Kessy, 2011; Max 1991). From the 1960s to the early 1970s, the newly appointed civil servants in central and local governments as explained by Pratt (1976), practiced the same attitudes and administrative style as their predecessors that were mismatched with the vision of the new government envisioned by Nyerere. It was during time that the powers of the Traditional chiefs were reduced with the move to create a more representative system of local government (Kessy, 2018). However, in reality this led to imposing top down approach by means of 'deconcentration'.

Deconcentration led to the introduction of three categories of local government were created: 1) the native authorities, 2) the district and 3) town councils and one municipality government (Kessy, 2018). These structures as noticed by Kessy (2018), appeared to carry same features as

those practiced during the pre-independence period, including lack of citizens' participation, weak mechanisms of accountability, and a general absence of transparency.

From 1972 to 1982, the country's decentralisation experienced more serious and radical changes that were reinforced due to the Arusha Declaration and the policy on socialism and rural development (1967-1972). The government at that period of time attempted to restructure local government in Tanzania particularly known as 'Madaraka Mikoani' for a period of ten years between 1972– 1982 (Tordoff, 1994; Shivji and Peter, 2003). This instead of leading into devolution of powers to the grassroots level, it turned into a deconcentration of powers with the dissolution of local government authorities (Kessy, 2018). One of the main feature of this new decentralisation reforms was the replacement of local government officers with highly qualified and experts from the central government (Mwaikusa, 1996).

In year 1982 marked a new wave of decentralisation reforms in Tanzania. It was during this year when LGAs were re-established, ward development committees revived and village governments incorporated into the district administration as a result of enactment of pieces of legislation with regard to local governance in Tanzania (Lyon, Zilihona and Masanyiwa, 2018). It was expected that the government will be able to rectify the past mistakes resulted from decentralisation reforms through greater involvement of citizens but this was not achieved. In reality, centralisation and concentration of power continued to exist in the organs of the central government partly due to the fusion of party and government personnel which remained until the end of mono-party democratic system in 1992. Hirschmann (2003) hinted that the general trend between 1961 and 1998 was highly centralised government. In addition, all the changes that were introduced by the decentralised reforms in 1980s were still the same as the previous ones (Mutizwa-Mangiza, 2001).

In order to address all the shortcomings and challenges resulted from decentralisation reforms, the government decided to embark on a major decentralisation programme in 1998, following the publication of the Local Government Reform Agenda in 1996 and the Policy Paper on Local Government Reforms of 1998 (Lyon, Zilihona and Masanyiwa, 2018). The new reform opted for devolution, D by D, unlike the past reforms and it has mainly been implemented through two Local Government Reform Programmes: LGRP I (2000 – 2008) and LGRP II (2009 – 2014).

With reference to Lyon, Zilihona and Masanyiwa (2018), there have been five dimensions to local government reform since the mid-1990s:

- a. **Financial:** Fiscal decentralisation allows LGAs to have their own sound sources of revenue, creating efficient intergovernmental fiscal transfers, providing efficient level of funding for the delivery of mandated services, improving revenue generation, guaranteeing transparency and fairness in fiscal allocations and ensuring equity in service delivery.
- b. **Administrative:** Decentralisation of personnel and restructuring of Local Government administration. Each Local Authority structured to reflect local needs and context.
- c. **Central-Local Relations:** Split in responsibilities with Central Government retaining policy making, support and facilitation, monitoring and quality assurance, and control mandated by law.
- d. **Service Function:** Improving service delivery at the local level was a key driver for the implementation of decentralisation by devolution. In theory, LGAs can be held accountable for service delivery through the 2000 Client Service Delivery Charter (CSDC).
- e. **Democratic:** Strengthening local democratic institutions and increasing public participation.

4.2.2 The Prevailing Situation

The LGRP put forward the mandate of LGAs to have the responsibility for social development and public service provision within their jurisdiction, facilitation of maintenance of law and order and issues of national importance such as education, health, water, roads and agriculture (URT, 1998). Since the inception of LGRP, there has been specific support for decentralisation from the Regional and Local Government leadership within the central government with additional support come from Non-State Actors⁹ (NSAs). These NSAs recognise the need for cooperation and show enthusiasm for strengthening cooperation between government and non-state actors (Lyon, Zilihona and Masanyiwa, 2018).

Accordingly, Lyon, Zilihona and Masanyiwa (2018) elucidated that in the last 20 years of implementing D by D in Tanzania, there has been two major reform programmes that facilitated the established structures for devolution with strong support from the government and

⁹ NSAs include Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Faith Based Organisations (FBOs), and Community Based Organisations (CBOs) like organised labour groups, youth and women's groups.

development partners. From policy point of view, there has been an increased citizen participation, for example, through local elections and involvement in projects through volunteer labour or supervision. However, on the other hand, there has been a limited enthusiasm for devolution across sector ministries whereby the preferred models applied were deconcentration and delegation as the form of service delivery. This is revealed by the creation of several executive agencies (in roads, transport, water supply, medical suppliers, forest), with unclear coordination with local authorities and their mandates to deliver services. This is what is referred by Kessy and McCourt (2010) as 'long-centralized administration'. This means, the central government still hold strong vested interest of maintain control over local governments through its Regional Commissioners and District Commissioners (Kessy 2008).

Currently, planning and resource allocation, is still a top-down drive unlike what has been provided in the legislation that establish LGAs. Local government laws underline the importance of participatory planning in Tanzania. These include Local Government Act No. 7 of 1982, the Local Government Financial (Block Grants) Act (paragraph 5). Act No. 7 of 1982 articulates the powers, responsibilities, and the functions of the various levels of LGAs in service delivery. These acts, *inter alia* empower the local communities to participate in planning, and demand the available government institutions to enable people to formulate their plans and targets (Baker, *et al.*, 2002). However, the process of involving local community in taking part in decision making is still not well implemented whereby they are mostly allowed to observe rather than deciding their own fate.

While there are procedures in place (and often followed) including the implementation of Opportunity and Obstacles to Development (O & OD) approach that ensure plans are driven by local needs are formed, but still national priorities especially from ruling party manifesto, and centrally-imposed budget priorities override the locally-endorsed plans. This weakness in the budget and planning process basically impose discrepancies in the service delivery in the grassroots level where actual implementation take place (Lyon, Zilihona and Masanyiwa, 2018). 2008). LGAs in several occasions lacked autonomous to make decisions to meet the needs and wants of their local communities they represent (Mollel, 2010; Ringo, *et al.*, 2013). This can be expressed in numerous ways, including, planning and grant allocations. The central government grant to local governments on the other hand has been a package accompanied with conditions

(Fjeldstad, 2010). In most cases as Mollel (2010) hinted, there will be no room for local communities to decide on their own fate.

4.3 Political-Will in Fostering Sustainable Urban Development within Central-Local Relations in Tanzania

4.3.1 Political Decentralisation in Tanzania

According to URT (1998), Political decentralisation is a devolution of powers and:

- (i) the setting of the rules for councils and committees, the chairpersons etc.
- (ii) the integration of previously centralised or deconcentrated service sectors into a holistic local government system
- (iii) installing councils as the most important local, political body within its jurisdiction.
- (iv) creation of real, multi-functional governments at the local level within the framework of the national legislation. (URT, 1998).

Findings from the Assessment of D by D conducted by Lyon, Zilihona and Masanyiwa (2018), reveal that the reform agenda set by the Government of Tanzania is broadly considered to have been successful in increasing awareness and practice of D by D at all levels, due to the established structures and impact of local government reforms. There is an increased people's participation in politics and local governance, which is manifested through increased participation in local elections especially at the very grassroots level, in planning and budgeting mechanisms through the Opportunities and Obstacles to Development (O&OD) planning methodology. The Assessment report reveals that up to 90% of the villages and wards in the sample LGAs were submitting participatory development plans. Citizens were also contributing labour and materials in construction of infrastructure.

Box 1: Experience from Korogwe District in Tanga region, Tanzania

Based on the report, "in one of the case study in labour, materials and finance from Korogwe District, the District Commissioner holds regular meetings with Mitaa/village chairpersons with an agenda of championing self-help, voluntary labour and contribution of financial resources. This practice in Korogwe is commonly known as "msalagambo". Between June 2017 and June 2018, the District has planned to construct 360 classrooms and 92 teachers' offices. This intervention is expected to cost Tshs 2,000,000,000 with more than 40% expected to come from

the community contribution.

The District Commissioner explained that each household is required to contribute money and at least 5 bricks, as well as labour for construction activities. The district has organised groups of people who have construction skills and are paid an honorarium which is much less than using contractors. When the central government transfers money for construction to the councils, such money is used to complement community initiatives. The total cost for a 45-pupil classroom is estimated at Tshs 15 million commercially and only 10 million through “msalagambo”. This implies that if the government transfers Tshs 80 million for construction of 5 classrooms, Korogwe can construct two more classrooms commonly known as “Madarasa ya Chenji” i.e. classrooms from the balance resulted from cost saving. The team visited Kilimani Primary school one of the schools constructed under this arrangement and observed classrooms with high quality and conducive learning environment. To support and show appreciation to the DC’s initiative and efforts, the assessment team organised themselves and contributed 20 bags of cement” (Lyon, Zilihona and Masanyiwa, 2018).

Furthermore, findings from the Assessment show increased transparency and citizen’s demand for accountability (Lyon, Zilihona and Masanyiwa, 2018). The normal practice is to send the village meetings’ meetings to the ward level where the issues are discussed and kept on minutes, and then after sent up to the Council for further decisions. In addition to this, citizens’ demands for financial transparency and accountability is also increasing through their elected representatives and participation of women, youth and other disadvantaged groups in local governance is increasing as noted by LGAs’ staff (Lyon, Zilihona and Masanyiwa, 2018).

Besides, findings from one of the study aimed at investigating the impact of D by D on improving farmers’ access to agricultural extension services in rural Tanzania based on empirical findings obtained from a sample of 273 farmers from selected villages in three wards of Hombolo, Kikombo and Chigongwe, in Dodoma City council, reveal that implementation of decentralisation has contributed to increased availability and distribution of agricultural extension staff at the ward and village levels (Masanyiwa, *et al.*, 2019). “According to these findings, farmers’ access to several agricultural extension services have been enhanced.

However, the number of extension staff is still far below to meet the needs of farmers, partly because LGAs do not have the discretion to recruit their staff which is still under the mandates of the Central Government” (Masanyiwa, *et al.*, 2019:4-7).

4.3.2 The Fundamental Facts about Political Will with Regards to Decentralisation in Tanzania

As it has been documented, D by D was introduced during first term of the third phase presidency and it was highly championed also by the 4th phase government, with support from the donor partners. The findings from assessment done by the Lyon, Zilihona and Masanyiwa (2018), show that some respondents considered all what has been done as technical and administrative ‘fixes’ rather than recognising the long-term, complex and challenging nature of deep institutional reform and behavioural change. While others considered that the speed and scope of reform was too go-getting.

The LGRP was among the series of reforms undertaken by the government, other includes Public Service Reform Programme, Financial Sector Reform Programme, Legal Sector Reform Programme and Business Environment Strengthening Programme. These programme to some of the respondents have been considered to be a major cause of lethargy to public service. On the other hand, over dependence on donor support in undertaking these reform LGRP being one of them is among the major cause of unsustainability of the reforms (Lyon, Zilihona and Masanyiwa, 2018). Moreover, there were other opinions with regards to accountability to development partners to some degree replaced accountability to the public.

To some extent there are have been transparency and accountability in terms of planning and budgeting processes due to its participatory nature of the process through O & OD approach. In principle, LGAs have authority to pass their own recurrent and development budgets. However, this procedure is mainly for checks and balance within the council level. Practically, the Central government through the ministry responsible for finance issues budget guideline that stipulate country’s priorities as well as giving budget ceilings for each LGA in the country. So at the end each and every LGA has to adhere to the National Budget Guidelines and plan for their next financial year accordingly. After series of internal scrutinisation from Council Management Team and relevant committees, the budget has to be submitted to the Full Council meeting for

approval before submitted to higher levels including relevant Regional Secretariat, the ministry responsible for LGAs as well as the ministry of finance. In return, the public continued to demand for financial reports and their representatives have been responding by providing the necessary information at village or *mtaa* meetings.

The final phase of the reforms ended in 2014, the Assessment observed that there has been a dwindling of knowledge of, and commitment to, implementation of D by D (Lyon, Zilihona and Masanyiwa, 2018). This has also led to many changes at practical level including staff changes, the termination of the mechanics of reform (positions of ‘focal points’, task forces and zonal reform teams) and hence contributed to losing momentum.

With the ongoing fifth phase of government administration, the autonomy of local governments in Tanzania looks to be more upwardly accountable to central government rather than to the elected members of their respective councils hence create fears of shrinking (Kessy, 2018). This can be observed through decision made by the President of Tanzania to appoint all the Council Directors unlike the past whereby apart from City Council directors, the rest were appointed by the Minister responsible for Local Government. Additionally, the executive powers of Regional and District Commissioners, who are Presidential representatives at their respective areas of jurisdiction, have been extended heavily over the LGAs. This new wave appears to weaken the spirit of the D-by-D, as stipulated in the Policy Paper on Local Government Reforms in Tanzania of 1998.

4.4 Challenges in Achieving Sustainable Urban Development in the context of Central-Local Relations in Tanzania

There is a high degree of central government imposition in the operations and functioning of LGAs in Tanzania. Rural and urban councils have legislative powers provided by the laws that have established them. The Local government legislation have empowered the Councils to enact by-laws, raise revenues, and prepare development plans and budgets. In reality, the Central government through its machinery at District and Regional level respectively, can intervene in the decision making process due to the ambiguity of its role. The enactment process of the by-laws ends up to the minister responsible for LGAs who has to sign and publish them in the government official gazette thus whenever there is a disagreement between the council (that has

been elected by the citizens), the minister (a presidential appointee, who is not necessarily being a constituent MP or even a special seat MP) has the final word. It should also be noted that central government appointees at the district level—the DC and Director—play an incredibly large role in local administration twisting the law-making powers against the local government. This has brought so much complaints especially in this fifth phase government whereby there are large number of these appointees belong to the ruling party as active members contravening to the Public Service laws and regulations that stipulate all public servants must be impartial with regards to politics.

It has been observed that there has been an inadequate coordination and communication at different levels of administration due to parallel systems of executive on one hand and representative on the other hand. Even when the existing council is under the same ruling party, there have been some clashes between presidentially appointees (RCs and DCs) and the Council on the other hand. In some places there have been multiple and sometimes conflicting directives issued to the local communities that in turn damaging the perception of LGAs' competence in carrying out its mandated responsibilities. Lyon, Zilihona and Masanyiwa (2018), in their findings depicted that there are mixed responses on this issue whereby some LGAs staff commented that the situation is perpetuated by low understanding of the local leaders' boundaries of their roles and functions; while, others considered that the power vested into councillors is too much and hence weakens technical excellence.

Findings from the assessment that was carried out by Lyon, Zilihona and Masanyiwa (2018), reveal that the general public lost interest on participating in community meetings due to the fact that they have continue to experience little action and/or changes on their identified priorities. This was also observed by the research findings from the Ibrahim Index for African Governance (IIAG, 2015) which revealed that since 2011, Tanzania has shown poorer performance in three out of the four governance categories (governance, rule of law, human rights and economic opportunity).

Moreover, MPs as explained in the previous sections are also councillors in their respective councils. This can be considered as a bridge between the central and local levels but on the other hand can results into conflict of interests and thus clouds accountability mechanisms. By the

Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, the Parliament is vested with the powers to oversee and advise the government on its daily businesses including the operations of LGAs through its Parliamentary Local Authorities Accounts Committee (LAAC). Same MP who is also a councillor can be a member of LAAC, which is mandated to scrutinise LGA audit reports. Therefore, in case of any conflict of interest there is a high possibility that the decision from LAAC can be partial to some councils since MPs have a final say.

Findings from the assessment revealed that poor working relations had been reported in some areas between councillors and MPs (Lyon, Zilihona and Masanyiwa, 2018). Respondents raised an issue of lack of prioritisation by MPs on the operations and functioning of LGA. During election's campaigns, the slogan is 'three cooking stones' that is, the president, MP and councillor from the same political party but after the elections, things change. MPs seemed to isolate themselves from their constituencies especially having limited cooperation with the councillors while at the same time having more day-to-day interaction with citizens. One Councillor commented.

“The MPs sometimes are not serious because they think matters related to wards and LGAs are not their duties rather matters at national level. They do not consistently attend the Full Council and Regional Consultative Committee Meetings. As a result, the nature of questions asked by MPs reflects how they are not informed about local realities because those questions and issues are discussed at the council level and because they do not attend such meetings they do not know what transpired. They therefore ask questions to let their voters hear from the Parliament that their MP asked a question which in actual fact is a waste of time”

As part of the political devolution process, the number of administrative areas has increased so as to bring government and services closer to the people. The data show that between 2008 and 2017, the numbers have increased as follows:

- (i) Councils from 133 to 185 (+ 41%),
- (ii) Wards from 2,555 to 4420 (+ 73%),
- (iii) Villages from 10,397 to 12,545 (+ 21%),

- (iv) *Mitaa* 1,755 to 4,000 (+ 128%) and
- (v) *Vitongoji* from 50,856 to 64,000 (+ 26%).

There is a high level of desire of political decentralisation as stipulated in the policy paper. The goal for a holistic system with multi-functional governments at the local level is ambitious. Additionally, there has been substantial progress made towards the devolution of powers with increased participation and some improvement in accountability. However, the speed of reform has decelerated since the end of reform programmes in the year 2014, and other factors have had an impact on how political devolution is being realised in practice. The autonomy of these LGAs has been restricted by the direct control of the central government over decision-making process in the LGAs: the LGAs are, in many cases, not consulted before policy measures are decided by the central government even when there is a little involvement still their recommendations are not directly included.

In general, it has been observed throughout that there is a substantial gap between the principles of devolution of power and actual practice and, with various, disorderly lines of accountability and possibly contradictory political agendas at work, there is little prospect of substantial change in the short-run.

The Public Service (Amendment) Act 2007 led to the establishment of Public Service Recruitment Secretariat, which has been vested with all the powers to recruit human resources in the public service including the LGAs (Kinemo et al; 2015). It is the duty of the Ministry responsible for Public Service Management to fill all the vacant posts including Council Directors, Heads of Departments and Units, and other junior and senior officers at a given LGA. Also, staff salaries are still entirely paid by central government transfers. However, recently, the process of recruitment for supporting staff cadres as well as executive officers for village or *mtaa* levels with LGAs which were once done by the secretariat are now carried out by the LGAs themselves.

5.0 LESSON LEARNT AND CONCLUSION

5.1 Lesson Learnt

The central and local relations have been improved by the Local government reforms carried out through harmonisation of some central and sector laws to align them with D by D; various ministerial platforms and frameworks have been introduced for coordination of local government interests; interface between sector Ministries and LGAs have been improved, as well as DPs and LGAs; integrated programme management have highly been promoted; and the reforms have been embedded in the operations of the ministry responsible for local governments, Regional Secretariats and LGAs.

Sector ministries and PO RALG are independent ministries with different responsibilities. Difficulties have been experienced with coordinating government businesses from central to local governments. Some sector ministries (education and health) have continued to transfer funds directly to local facilities rather than through LGAs. Recently, some of the sectors that were under coordination of PORALG are now under direct coordination of their respective line ministries. The decentralisation reforms have also experienced low recognition from the central and sector ministries on the coordination role of PORALG and RSs as well as the role of LGAs on delivery of services. These ministries continued to exert tough protectionism on significant autonomy, decisions, financial and human resources with respect to their line responsibilities.

Some key development programmes are still under auspices of line ministries. For instance, Commission for Irrigation under the Ministry of Water and Irrigation, earmarked irrigation projects; rehabilitation of government-owned old secondary schools (ministry of education), construction of dispensaries and health centres (ministry of health) and capacity development programmes at the local level (ministries of health and water). There is a confusion of roles and the potential for duplication of efforts e.g. LGA receive multiple and sometimes mismatched directives from Ministry of Education/ Health *and* the Departments of Education/ Health within PORALG.

Creation of executive agencies is seen as a 'back door' for ministries to retain their power against the thrust of Decentralisation by Devolution as it was intended in the first place (e.g. rural and urban roads, forests) in return this led to confusion, duplication of efforts and inefficiency.

5.2 Conclusion

Aspiring local government reform programme had support for fast-paced change. However, inadequate political will and commitment of leaders in promoting D by D in some extent made it impossible to accomplish the desired goal. It is clear that the D by D agenda has been carried out without a binding comprehensive national policy and legislation. This calls for a comprehensive national policy that will set out issues and strategies to be implemented, legal framework as well as institutional framework with responsibilities of each and every institution in the country to spearhead D by D and do away with willingness and voluntarism. Also, the experience showed that there had been a mix of devolution, deconcentration and delegation which took place across sectors. Thus, there is a need for a change of mind set and development of a shared vision of decentralisation across the government and Non State Actors particularly the academia.

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