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Decentralized Cooperation in Development and the Aid/Development Effectiveness.

The Added-Value of Local Governments in Development Cooperation

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The growing presence of European sub-state governments in development cooperation is becoming gradually recognized, yet it has not been thoroughly analyzed. Due to limited evidence-based monitoring volumes of cooperation provided by the sub-state governments and the fact that the phenomena only recently gained more international support, the literature remains scant. The article presents models of decentralized cooperation provided by the selected European sub-state governments. Having recognized the ongoing debates on the concept of effectiveness in development cooperation, the article looks at the relationship between internationally agreed principles in aid/development effectiveness and interpretations of the concept at the sub-state level. The main argument behind the article is that despite adopting a common framework of multi-stakeholder partnership in development cooperation, the concepts of effectiveness in development are divergent for the international community and for the sub-state governments. While the former is still preoccupied with a state-centric approach, the latter developed alternative models through the forms of decentralized cooperation

Keywords: sub-state governments, development cooperation, decentralized cooperation in development, development effectiveness

1. Introduction: the concept of decentralized cooperation in development

The growing presence of sub-state governments on the international scene becomes a process of inevitable and irreversible political consequences. Traditionally economy-related, in recent years the international activity of sub-state governments has entered new frontiers, incorporating a normative dimension. Consequently, sub-state governments have begun performing in politically sensitive areas such as human rights or development cooperation, framing themselves as active contributors to global problem-solving. In the context of European regions' international activity, special attention is re-focused on the decentralized cooperation in development, which highlights the sub-state authorities as full-fledged stakeholders. Close to the ground, with their expertise on micro-scale service delivery to serve local communities directly, they present themselves as suitable for the localization of development goals and for establishing a participatory development process (OECD, 2018: 26). However, until recently, the recognition of the value that sub-state governments' contribution to development assistance provides has not been common among the EU institutions and national governments (Bossuyt, Steenbergen, 2013: 4). Until today there is no common understanding of a concept of decentralized cooperation in development (cf. Hafteck, 2003). Definitions vary from a donor-driven approach, focused on assistance delivered by the modern actors (e.g. OECD), to more issue-oriented approach, focused on the practice of exchange between development partners in both the North-South and South-South types of cooperation (e.g. the United Cities and Local Governments, UCLG). Given the objectives of the article, the conception adopted here is general. Decentralized cooperation is considered a type of wide-range development cooperation activities carried out by decentralized actors, both public and private, in a North-South, South-South, and triangular configurations through general and traditional development assistance programmes (e.g. ODA) and non-traditional activities, particular to local-level activities (i.e. exchange of knowledge or sharing good practices).

The incremental recognition of the growing role which sub-state governments play in development cooperation gave impetus towards normalizing such practices through the ongoing institutionalization of decentralized cooperation. The article analyzes decentralized cooperation of selected sub-state governments: Flanders and Wallonia (Belgium); Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, and Hamburg (Germany); Catalonia (Spain); Scotland, and Wales (United Kingdom). All governments are active in development cooperation with the initial support traceable to the 198 and 1990s (e.g. Flanders' support for provinces in Mozambique

or Hamburg's support for NGOs in post-conflict countries). Predominantly, development cooperation policy was incorporated into governments' agendas soon they were assigned with more international competencies in state reforms (e.g. Flemish Government signed the first memorandum of understanding with South Africa in 2001) or in the devolution process (e.g. Scottish International Development Fund was established in 2005, whereas the Welsh Government launched Wales for Africa programme in 2006). In some cases, as for Catalonia, development cooperation proceeded any other external dimensions of the government's policies. Moreover, they have opened representation offices in developing countries with whom they cooperate (e.g. Catalonia in Morocco and Mozambique; Hamburg in Nicaragua; Flanders in Malawi and Mozambique; Wallonia in Tunisia, Morocco, and DR Kongo).

Despite the presence of sub-state governments in decentralized cooperation, the literature remains scarce when compared with the literature on non-state actors' engagement in development cooperation (cf. Hoebink, Schulpen, 2014), or on the role of civil society (cf. Kalm, Uhlin, 2015) and non-governmental organizations (cf. Koch, 2009; Smillie et al., 1999). Moreover, the literature on the sectoral policies of municipalities and cities is growing, including issues as climate change (cf. van Staden, 2010) and sustainable development (cf. Baker, Eckerberg, 2008). Regarding the sub-state dimension of development cooperation, the research is unbalanced and biased towards the analyses of the performance of local authorities from developing countries (cf. de la Cruz et al., 2011). From the North-partner perspective, case-study research covers particular examples, i.e. Flanders (Waeterloos, Renard, 2013) or German states (cf. Athenstaedt, 2011), whereas others refer to development assistance activities as part of a bigger picture of international sub-state activity, i.e. by Wales (cf. Wyn Jones, Royles, 2012). The problem with the analysis of local-to-local development cooperation is twofold. First, there is insufficient empirical evidence, since central governments generally do not disaggregate collected data to specify contribution from the sub-state level. The expected administrative burdens for central governments make them reluctant to report on growing sub-state governments' engagement. The inter-governmental coordination mechanisms are also insufficient, resulting in a lack of information-sharing. Consequently, there is limited evidence-based monitoring and evaluation of ongoing projects delivered by sub-state governments (OECD, 2018: 79-81). Second, the institutionalization of decentralized cooperation took shape only recently. It was due to the millennial declaration and subsequent Agenda 2030 that call for a participatory approach in development. Despite

practices of decentralized cooperation tracing back to the 1980s and the 1990s, the step towards their institutionalization starts with the beginning of the 21st century.

The main argument behind the article is that despite the adoption of a common framework concerning multi-stakeholder partnership in development cooperation, the concept of effectiveness in development is divergent for the international community and the sub-state governments. On the one hand, the international community developed the standards of aid/development effectiveness, which ensures the position of traditional donors, mainly states and international organization. On the other, the regional governments confirm their alignment with internationally agreed standards, yet they develop their own strategies and understandings of development effectiveness.

The empirical basis of the article consists of the analysis of documents, reports, and strategies at international and sub-state governments' level and the semi-structured interviews. Regarding the former, the attention was given the strategies, memorandum of understandings, guidelines of development cooperation, and grant procedures in order to extract the general patterns of development cooperation provided by the selected cases. The analysis was complemented by a series of semi-structured interviews conducted with representatives of sub-state governments, the representatives of institutions cooperating with governments in designing and implementing local-based development cooperation, the local-based NGO sector, as well as with the representatives of the EU institutions and associations of local and regional governments cooperating with sub-state governments in the field of development.

The findings show that the sub-state governments from particular countries adopted different models of decentralized cooperation, which affected the ways they understand the concept of effectiveness in development cooperation. The models can be characterized as (1) leadership in development cooperation, focused on awareness raising and education in development in order to enhance the citizens' understanding of global challenges, which would result in strong, critical and informed engagement in development issues (German federal states); (2) management of development cooperation, focused on the political management of development assistance policy as a public policy, what reflects the traditional donors' approach to development (Flanders, Catalonia, and Scotland aspiring); and (3) facilitation of development cooperation, where the small-scale projects are the main channels of cooperation, the role of sub-state government is limited to catalyze the activity of non-state

sector, and the reciprocity remains the key principle of development assistance as a tool to benefit local citizens (Wales).

2. Conceptualizing effective cooperation: from aid to development effectiveness

With the millennial mobilization derived from the UN Millennial Declaration, the global efforts to tackle the negative consequences of poverty and inequalities between countries gained a new pace. As noted by Raimo Väyrynen (2005: 9) the millennial development goals (MDGs) became "major yardsticks" in assessing the legitimacy of processes brought up by the globalization. However, growing ambitions clash with empirical evidence from the previous decades. The World Bank Report published in 1998 assessed that whereas in some places foreign aid provided success stories, in others it was "an unmitigated failure" (World Bank, 1998). Framing the foreign aid as the conjunction of money and ideas – "foreign aid is as much about knowledge as it is about money" (World Bank, 1998: ix). The notion of effectiveness has been reduced to the concept that needs to be evaluated in financial terms rather than be considered as process-related. However, the report also draws attention to the experiments with decentralization practices in education, for which the creation of space for non-state actors and for expanded local autonomy is critical (World Bank, 1998: 108-111).

Effectiveness became a principle in development with the Monterrey Consensus of 2002, followed by the high-level summits on aid effectiveness in Rome (2003), Paris (2005) and Accra (2008), which together shaped the landscape of the development cooperation system and paved the way towards a new paradigm. The high-level summit in Rome, although it "produced little concrete progress", began the debate on the concept of effectiveness in development cooperation (Atwood, 2012: 4). The final outcome of the summit, the Rome Declaration (OECD, 2003), singles out obstacles originating from the preparation and negotiation processes that hinder the said effectiveness in partner countries: (1a) overproduction of transaction costs, (2a) limited support for capacity building at the partner-country level, and (3a) mismatch between donors' activities and national development priorities and systems. Alongside the harmonization principle, the concept of country ownership related to the country-based approach becomes critical. The steering role remains at the country level in the partner country, and the North-based partners are requested to refocus their engagement on capacity building areas. Additionally, the country-based approach is expected to be complemented by the full recognition of diversified aid modalities, and as a result to provide an enabling, participatory environment that is engaging civil society

and NGOs. As noted by Janet Hunt, although official donors tend to adopt the language of participation, they rarely made the concrete efforts to implement a participatory approach (Hunt, 2016, p. 174) The Paris Declaration adopted in the aftermath of the high-level 2005 Paris summit confirmed the preceding principles and supplemented them with additional ones, recognizing all of them as significant global norms for development cooperation (Kim, Lee, 2013: 791). The declaration concluded that progress in development will be tracked and monitored, and consequently, the successes and failures of donors will be evaluated and measured (Groff, 2011). Due to the specification of indicators to which parties committed themselves, the Paris summit offered a road map for aid effectiveness that was grounded in a practical approach to development. Importantly, the Paris Declaration provided an enabling framework while introducing dialogue on aid practices and empowering both donors and recipients in the reform effort for better coordination (Kim, Lee, 2013: 790). The Paris Declaration was groundbreaking since for the first time donors and partner countries agreed to measure their progress in an effort to enhance aid impact (Groff, 2011). It provided a framework to enable evidence-based dialogue to improve aid practices and their impact on development on the ground (Killen, Rogerson, 2010). It empowered donors and developing countries to push through aid management reforms within their respective domestic political arenas. However, despite the continuous efforts to become inclusive, the composition of the development cooperation system continued to be dominated by donors (Lawson, 2013). The declaration did not explicitly refer to or recognize the role of regional governments in development cooperation. In the following declarations, all prospective stakeholders in this field were encouraged "to use the Paris Declaration principles as a point of reference" (OECD, 2011a: 18). Due to the lobbying efforts of the UCLG and UNDP (Bossuyt, Steenbergen, 2013: 11), the Accra Agenda for Action of 2008 explicitly recognized non-traditional donors' increasing contribution to the development. Decentralized actors – parliaments, local governments, NGOs, CSOs, research institutions, and the media – were encouraged to participate actively in development processes, specifically in the country-level policy dialogue on development. Along with decentralization, an emphasis has been put on the localization of development in the partner country. Developing countries are expected to single out areas and levels where capacity-building remains crucial, including the divergence between central-government and sub-state levels (OECD, 2011a: 16). Indirectly, the consequence of localization effort was the change in donor cooperation patterns. Parties commit themselves to the promotion of the provision of technical cooperation by local resources, encouraging South-South cooperation and triangular cooperation.

Table 1. High-level summits on aid effectiveness: principles for donors	
Rome Declaration (2003):	Reduction of transaction costs
	Country-based approach regarding the principle of ownership
	Capacity-building in a partner country
	Participation of civil society and non-public sector
Paris Declaration (2005):	Aid flows to sectors reported on partners' national budgets
	Strengthen capacity by coordinated support
	Use of country public financial management system
	Use of country procurement system
	Avoid parallel implementation structures (units)
	Predictability of aid flows
	Untied aid
	Programme-based approach
	Shared analysis and joint diagnostic reviews
Accra Agenda for Action (2008):	Inclusive partnership
	Capacity development
	Delivering results

Source: Author's work based on OECD (2003), OECD (2011a).

The design of the aid effectiveness framework presents a mixed picture. The overarching goals to rationalize and coordinate diffused and siloed approaches stumbled over the complexity of the aid field (Verbecke, Waeterloos, 2010: 5). In 2007, the World Bank report on aid architecture assessed two particular trends which "can be damaging to the effectiveness" of donors' aid and unproductively engender transaction costs – the proliferation of aid channels and the associated fragmentation of aid (World Bank, 2007: 21). The first trend denotes both the donors' proliferation understood as "a large number of donors, each with a smaller share of the project market" (Knack, Rahman, 2004: 12) and the multiplicity of channels through which aid is provided. The proliferation of donors tends to be associated with short-term costs (i.e. transaction costs, tied aid) and long-term costs (i.e. undermining the quality of governance) (World Bank, 2007; Knack, Rahman, 2004). To overcome these issues, the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda adopted a concept of the division of labor in development that is expected to result in a pragmatic approach to development. Specifically, the Accra Agenda aimed to reduce the costs of fragmentation of aid (cf. Hunt, 2016, pp. 172-173) manifested predominantly in overlapping initiatives at country and sector levels (OECD, 2011a: 17).

The division of labor in development cooperation is specifically important in the European context since it is seen as an "especially European trend to bring development cooperation closer to citizens", and to open a way for sub-state governments to cooperate in development assistance (Verbecke, Waeterloos, 2010: 6). In 2007, the EU released the Code of Conduct on the division of labor in development cooperation, which adopts assumptions of the World Bank that "[t]oo many donors are concentrating on the same countries and the same sectors" (European Commission, 2007: 3). As the argument follows, this unwanted trend contributes to deepening the well-described problem of "aid orphans" and "aid darlings" (cf. Ellison, 2016, Marysse et al., 2007). Although the Code of Conduct remains voluntary, it is directed to all decision-makers in the EU structures engaged in development assistance. The guiding issue is the concept of complementarity, which aims to optimize the division of labor between various actors. Among its well-identified dimensions such as the in-country complementarity (aid fragmentation in partner countries) or the cross-country and cross-sector complementarity (donors' partiality towards particular countries and sectors), there is also a recognized need for vertical complementarity. The EU, therefore, identifies the duplication of activities carried out "simultaneously at the national (including sub-national), regional and international levels" (European Commission, 2007: 6). Strategically, the proposed solution relies on the limitation of both the sectors and countries of priority in which donors are engaged. Operationally, the countries of priority, modalities, and sectors should be selected and implemented reflecting the principles of donor's added-value and, when necessary, through delegated cooperation.

The shift from aid to development effectiveness was introduced at the high-level summit in Busan. However, instead of being the continued success of previous efforts, findings presented in Busan have painted a picture of limited achievements. The evaluation report on aid effectiveness has shown modest results as out of 13 targets, only one has been met (OECD, 2011b). As noted by Eun Mee Kim and Jae Eun Lee, before the Busan summit the international community was concerned "whether to give up the aid effectiveness agenda (…) and move on to a new paradigm, or to finish the business of aid effectiveness", recognizing that the move has already taken place (Kim, Lee, 2013: 791). The core concept of effectiveness has been maintained, but the angle has shifted towards horizontal and mutually beneficial partnership. In the aid effectiveness debates, the emphasis was given to technical mechanisms such as aid management and delivery, and therefore the sight of a larger picture of development outcomes was lost (Kindornay, Samy, 2012: 5-6). Yet, the Busan summit has

been acknowledged the aid is not the only development resource and as such, it cannot address underdevelopment alone (Kim, Lee, 2013: 792). The partnership modality launched in Busan provided an incentive to overcome the traditional types of relations (North-South) and to introduce more inclusive community of partners in development while recognizing the growing role of all stakeholders involved, from states to CSOs, academia and local governments (de Losada Passols, 2017: 15). Consequently, the Busan Partnership points to the need to broaden the focus of the challenges related to effective development into a new framework. And in it, the role of decentralized actors – sub-state governments – would resemble partnership-like cooperation, rather than the type of traditional aid-donor relations (Bossuyt, Steenbergen, 2013: 11). The shift calls for the "aid" effectiveness to be replaced by the "development" effectiveness. The framework of the Busan Partnership (OECD, 2011c) re-designed the principles of the Paris Declaration, setting four guidelines: (1) ownership of development priorities by developing countries where the partner countries primarily identify their needs as well as they prepare a country-tailored approach and manage the implementation process if possible – in such cases, the North-based central and regional authorities should be obliged to leave the leading role to their counterparts; (2) focus on results, which assumes that activities in development cooperation should have a long-lasting impact on society in a partner country – from the perspective of regional authorities it is crucial to ensure that the focus is given to strengthening the capacities of local bodies in managing the results, as well as in monitoring and evaluation processes (Bossuyt, Steenbergen, 2011: 11); (3) inclusive development partnership, with the recognition of actor diversification, resembled in the diversification of functions; (4) transparency and accountability to each other, and accountability to intended beneficiaries of development cooperation.

3. The problem of aid/development effectiveness of sub-state governments

Although the Paris Declaration does not refer explicitly to the sub-state governments, the discourse of how to comply with declaratory standards has been embraced by sub-state governments, yet to a different extent. In strategies of those governments to whom development cooperation remains an important part of the comprehensive international activity (Flanders and Catalonia) the concepts of aid/development effectiveness were incorporated directly into regional guidelines and strategies. It indicates that both governments remain to a large extent responsive to the changes in the international realm and express their interests in maintaining compliance with international standards set as norms.

Consequently, the managerial approach to development cooperation resembles modalities of cooperation performed by the states, as states are not only responsible not only for generating opportunity for locally-based stakeholders to engage, but they manage the whole political process of policy formulation and implementation. In order to comply with principles of Paris Agreement, Flanders incrementally reshaped the bilateral modalities of its development assistance policy through the adoption of a long-term country strategy towards a limited number of the partner countries, and in a limited number of sectors (Waeterloos, Renard, 2011, p. 330). And indeed, the Catalan and Flemish declaratory compliance with international standards as well as participation in international networks (cf. Happaerts et al., 2011) express the ambition to become full-fledged stakeholders in development cooperation. The Flemish Decree on Development Assistance of 2007 (Flemish Government, 2007) mirrors the principles and requirements associated with aid effectiveness, and it anchors the Flemish cooperation in the principles of ownership, partnership, harmonization, and coordination. Similarly, there is pressure to coordinate efforts with other donors. There are practical examples of effective cooperation between the Flemish Government and other entities, for instance, coordination between the Flemish and the Belgian governments in Mozambique. However, the Belgian-Flemish cooperation in a delegated modality requires further harmonization (Waeterloos, Renard, 2013). The explicit commitment to aid effectiveness is made in terms of long-term result-oriented cooperation, with the assumption of no less than five-year engagement in particular countries. The 2018 OECD report estimates that the Flemish development activity met the requirements of aid/development effectiveness (OECD, 2018: 46).

A similar path was chosen by the Government of Catalonia, the external and quasi-diplomatic activities of which Government tend to have more in common with traditional (state) activities that with other sub-state governments (Duran, 2016, p. 42). Specifically, the importance in external relations by Catalonia is given to development cooperation, since such policy remains central argument justifying the international engagement (cf. Lecours, 2008, p. 5). The Catalan Government presents development assistance as an opportunity to elaborate on its international relations due to the reluctance from Madrid (Duran, 2016, p. 300). Catalonia's master plans for development cooperation also make the references to the concept of aid/development effectiveness. In the 2011-2014 Master Plan (The Catalan Government, 2011), Catalan government expresses willingness to contribute to the international debate on aid/development effectiveness, with a focus on the specific position of the Catalan

Government, distinct from traditional donors. The commitment to implement the principles of ownership, alignment, harmonization, result-oriented development, and mutual accountability serves as the overarching rules. Such ambitions are also expressed by the Scottish Government, which shares development cooperation policy between traditional development assistance, capacity-strengthening activities, and investments (The Scottish Government, 2016). Although the Scottish Strategy does not explicitly refer to the principles of aid/development effectiveness, the governmental programme of small grants for international development organizations based in Scotland clearly underlines in its detailed overview that the programme "must adhere to the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness", as well as the subsequent international documents (The Scottish Government, Corra Foundation, 2018). Yet, the progress in measurements of effectiveness is hard to follow, since no detailed data are provided, and consequently, the Scottish effort in international development is "an 'off-the-book' anomaly, in terms of accountability and performance" (Gibson, 2016: 6-7). When compared to Flanders and Catalonia, the Scottish Government is also limited in its development assistance capacity, since under the Scotland Act development cooperation remains a reserved matter of the central government.

With the exceptional performance of Flanders, the general picture is more complex. As confirmed in interviews, the initial problem with the concept of aid effectiveness is that it does not reflect properly the changing reality of development cooperation structure. The proliferation of donors remains a fact, and the Paris criteria and the following international standards are not compatible with the conditions of non-traditional donors. Moreover, much of the debate on effectiveness concentrates at a macro level (Hunt, 2016, p. 176). Even in the case of the Busan Partnership, where explicit references to sub-state authorities could be found, the importance of principles is placed at the national level. It affects the evaluation and measurements of regional-originated development assistance. Consequently, the effectiveness assessment of sub-state governments is hardly traceable. Although there is no tangible evidence whether the principles of Busan Partnership are met by regional governments, the preliminary evaluations show that regions mostly adhere to the principle of ownership and decentralized cooperation, as the "projects are generally aligned with priority themes in municipal and regional structures, and thus have 'local traction'" (Bossuyt, Steenbergen, 2013: 24).

Against this backdrop, there is a growing pressure to extend the current framework to decentralized actors. The responsibility for monitoring the principles of development

effectiveness lies with the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC), the multi-stakeholder platform created in 2011 which carries out evidence-based monitoring of development effectiveness implementation progress. Since 2014, the representation of the UCLG and the Forum of Regional Governments and Global Associations of Regions (FOGAR) has participated as a full member in the GPEDC Steering Committee. In order to contribute to worldwide effectiveness, the UCLG/FOGAR have proposed a number of initiatives based on local expertise for which the GPEDC has expected to provide a platform for sharing good practices, including developing country road maps for sub-state governments to implement Busan rules during the New York Steering Committee meeting in 2014 (GPEDC, 2014a: 5). The pilot action, confirmed in the Mexico Communique, after the first high-level meeting of the GPEDC in 2014 (GPEDC, 2014b: 11), was suspended, however, as reported in the Mexico GPEDC Steering Committee report of 2015 on the follow-ups of global initiatives (GPEDC, 2015a). Moreover, the decentralized actors were not included in the round monitoring report provided by the GPEDC, though they have been encouraged to participate in analysis and policy dialogue on the monitoring findings (GPEDC, 2015b). Not surprisingly, in the absence of tangible effects, the UCLG showed decreasing interest in the GPEDC format.

Due to the lack of appropriate monitoring and reporting practices, the assessment of sub-state governments in terms of the internationally agreed standards is difficult. The GPEDC monitoring does not cover the local disaggregation, and the economic data presented by the OECD peer reviews for particular countries are incomplete and insufficient. As interviews confirm, there are two basic problems with compliance with international standards: potential transaction costs and discontinuity. Although the survey conducted by the OECD in 2017 shows that, in general, cooperation provided by sub-state governments does not impose administrative burdens on central governments in partner countries, and the transactions are incomparably smaller than those of central governments (OECD, 2018: 45-47), the picture at the level of particular sub-state governments is mixed. Typically, the units in charge of development cooperation within the structure of sub-state governments are understaffed and lacking resources. Indeed, part of a solution is the close cooperation with the networks and associations of local/regional governments in development assistance, such as PLATFORMA/CEMR or the United Cities and Governments (UCLG). Yet, more tangibly, the problem with small-scale units is that they are more prone to produce transaction costs, since higher costs of project consultation, drafting and negotiation are incurred. The lack of

critical scale affects implementation costs to a substantial extent. These are mainly generated due to the high fragmentation at the local level. The projects and missions are conducted in a fragmented way, in a sense that they require the engagement of a wide spread of stakeholders.

Due to the limited competencies in development assistance and with the assumption of a subsidiary role the assistance is to a large extent provided through indirect bilateral channels, implemented by non-governmental organizations acting as intermediaries. In German federal states – Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg – indirect bilateral cooperation remains the main modality of assistance delivery[1]. The administration and management of grants are delegated to non-state actors or agencies, such as SEZ Baden-Württemberg, Wales Council for Voluntary Action and Wallonie-Brussels International. Hamburg authorities developed a similar approach; however, the added value lies in its specific status of a city with the rights of the federal state. It creates an opportunity to combine approaches to development assistance provided by regional authorities with the development of partnership modality of direct cooperation in the form of city twinning – with Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) and León (Nicaragua). In cases of Catalonia and Flanders, the indirect bilateral cooperation is complemented by the direct bilateral modality (partnership and agency modality) and multilateral channels. A distinctive feature of both Flemish and Catalan approaches to development cooperation is the commitment to assist in the form of ODA. Moreover, both Catalonia and Flanders established not only relations with regional governments, but also direct contact with national governments, which is crucial in their approach.

The major problem in decentralized cooperation is a discontinuity, which significantly affects the predictability of assistance. It is affected by both external and internal causes. From the structural perspective, the regional governments are limited in scope. On the one hand, they are limited by the electoral mandate and act as service providers for the constituency. Therefore, they are expected to improve the quality of domestic institutions and services. Moreover, they are limited by the foreign policy of central governments. After the central government of Germany suspended the relations with the governments of Burundi, the regional government was forced to impede its relations in turn, as the representatives of regional government were not allowed to conduct any missions. However, beyond the structural obstacles, the discontinuity is also affected by economic factors. Due to the limited financial resources, the sub-state governments tend to allocate funds to short-term

[1] The same trend is observable for Wales and Wallonia.

programmes and projects. The Scottish Government allocates financial resources for country-oriented development programmes for a five-year period, and the additional funding is allocated to the small-grant programme with an aim to finance projects for up to three years. The Catalan Government adopts a similar approach of four-year Masters Plans. Likewise, shorter projects are supported by the Welsh Government – small-scale grants up to one year, and up to three-year multi-year grant, and the Baden-Württemberg – financed projects are expected to be no longer than two years. Paradoxically, the process of programme preparation, from drafting to negotiating the associated contracts, runs nearly as long as the realization of the programme or project. Consequently, the time pressure associated with terminated projects affects the sustainability thereof. Fluctuations are not only related to the project-level financing, but also to the budget level. The economic crisis of 2008 in Catalonia influenced the volatility in development financing from EUR 67.4 million in 2008 to EUR 6.23 million in 2014. The current budget flows for development assistance are estimated to be EUR 17.4 million. However, Catalonia seems to remain the exception. Comparatively, the funds' allocation is relatively stable – with some increasing tendencies – for Scotland (cf. The Scottish Government, 2018), Wales (cf. The Welsh Government, 2016; The Welsh Government 2017; The Welsh Government 2018) and the German federal states (cf. WUS & Federal and Federal-States Committee on Development Cooperation, 2018). A particular case here is the Government of Flanders, which puts in an effort to ensure the long-term financial predictability and the transparency of funds allocation (cf. Flanders Department of Foreign Affairs, 2018).

The discontinuity impacts the changing focal points of sub-state governments in development cooperation. It is mainly experienced by these governments which are engaged in more than 3-4 countries and sectors. However, the current trends are concentrating more on reversing the patterns of development cooperation fragmentation. Most sub-state governments shrink their development programmes in terms of countries of priority as assistance recipients, and the number of sectors of engagement. The exception here is the Catalan Government and the Wallonie-Bruxelles International since they are cooperating with over 10 partner countries each. Yet, they are involved with a limited number of sectors in particular priority countries, e.g. Catalonia focuses on gender in Morocco or healthcare in Mozambique. Tables 2 and 3 outline the sectors and countries of engagement (countries of priority) for particular European sub-state governments. The countries where such governments are managing and implementing developmental programmes are not necessarily the least developed countries as

estimated by the OECD, nor are they geographically limited. Generally, they do not correspond with the top beneficiaries of ODA provided by respective central governments, with the exception of Spain, where the recipients of Spanish ODA overlap with the Catalan countries of priority (table 3).

Table 2. The sectors of engagement of the selected sub-state governments

		Education	Health	Human rights	Good Governance	Migration	Sustainable development	Energy	Food security, rural, agriculture	Culture	Climate & environment
Flanders	Belgium	✓	✓				✓		✓		
Wallonia	Belgium	✓		✓	✓				✓	✓	
Baden-Württemberg	Germany	✓	✓								
Bavaria	Germany				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Hamburg	Germany		✓				✓	✓	✓		
Catalonia	Spain	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓				
Scotland	United Kingdom	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓		✓
Wales	United Kingdom	✓	✓				✓				✓

Source: Author's work based on document analysis and interviews

Table 3. Top recipients of the national ODA compared with the regional countries of priority

Country	Level	Main recipient (national) / countries of priority (regional)
Belgium	National (2016)	1. Turkey 2. Cuba 3. Syrian Arab Republic **4. Morocco** 5. Afghanistan 6. Ethiopia 7. India 8. China 9. Jordan 10. Pakistan
	Flanders	South Africa, Mozambique, Malawi
	Wallonia	**Morocco**, Palestine, Tunisia, DR Congo, Burkina Faso, Rwanda, Senegal, Haiti, Burundi, Guinea, Benin
Germany	National (2016)	1. China 2. Syria 3. India 4. Indonesia 5. Morocco 6. Afghanistan 7. South Africa **8. Iraq** 9. Turkey 10. Mexico
	Baden-Württemberg	Burundi, Peru, Kenya
	Bavaria	**Iraq,** Lebanon, Tunisia, Senegal, Jordan, Togo
	Hamburg	Tanzania, Nicaragua
Spain	National (2016)	1. Cuba 2. Turkey 3. Syria **4. Morocco** 5. Peru **6. Colombia** **7. El Salvador** **8. Palestine** **9. Bolivia** **10. Guatemala**
	Catalonia	**Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Morocco, Palestine**, Nicaragua, Senegal, Equator, Mozambique, Western Sahara
United Kingdom	National (2016)	**1. Pakistan** 2. Syria 3. Ethiopia 4. Nigeria 5. Afghanistan 6. Tanzania 7. Jordan 8. Sierra Leone 9. South Sudan 10. Bangladesh
	Scotland	Malawi, Rwanda, Zambia, **Pakistan**
	Wales	Uganda, Lesotho

Source: Data obtained from the European Commission Aid Explorer (2019), https://euaidexplorer.ec.europa.eu/AidOverview.do.

4. Forms of decentralized cooperation in development: European practice

Over recent decades, the definition of decentralized cooperation has been predominantly limited to the identification of actors to whom the concept refers. Since there is a particular consensus that decentralized cooperation is mainly limited to local and regional authorities (cf. Hafteck, 2003), the diversification of activities under decentralized cooperation is more disputable. Although, generally direct cooperation remains a predominant type, in the context of European local and regional authorities types and modalities are far more diversified (cf. de Losada Passols, 2017: 9-11). Along with the conventional direct cooperation, indirect cooperation, as a type of cooperation provided through the local-based NGOs and CSOs becomes more common among the European sub-state governments. The specific case is delegated cooperation, which traditionally was performed by national agencies, yet in recent years more regional authorities express the willingness to participate. Yet, apart from external activities, many sub-state governments developed a domestic dimension of development, as activities aiming at raising awareness at home through development education, a campaign to citizens and organization of events sensitizing citizens towards global challenges. Table 4 compiles the diversification of types of decentralized cooperation in development at the sub-state governments level. Table 5 illustrates the adoption of particular modalities by selected sub-state governments.

Table 4. Forms of decentralized cooperation in Europe

EXTERNAL							**DOMESTIC**	
Direct					**Delegated**	**Indirect**	**Towards own citizens**	**Towards citizens of partner countries**
Vertical		Horizontal						
Aid transfers, budget supports, directed subsidies	Through agency as the executive body	Transfer of know-how	Peer-to-peer, mutual learning	Exchange of practices, innovations	Technical cooperation, exchange of experience	Through NGOs, CSOs	Raising awareness activities	Scholarships for students, workers, internees

Source: Own compilation based on OECD (2018), de Lossada Passols (2017), interviews.

Table 5: Application of particular forms by the selected sub-state governments

				Flanders	Wallonia	Scotland	Wales	Catalonia	Baden-Württemberg	Hamburg
EXTERNAL	DIRECT	Vertical	Aid transfer (ODA), budget support, direct subsidies for projects, grant mechanisms	YES	YES (grant mechanism only)	YES (grant mechanism only)	YES (grant mechanism only)	YES	YES (grant mechanism only)	YES
			Through agency	until 2013	-	-	-	YES	-	-
		Horizontal	Peer-to-peer & mutual learning	YES	YES	YES	YES	-	-	YES
			Transfer of know-how (partnership)	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
			Exchange of practices or innovations	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
	DELEGATED COOPERATION		Technical cooperation, exchange of practices	YES	-	-	-	YES	-	-
	INDIRECT		Implementation through NGOs, CSOs; supporting non-state sector	YES (limited to partners)	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
DOMESTIC	TOWARDS OWN CITIZENS		Raising awareness at home	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
	TOWARDS PARTNER-COUNTRY CITIZENS		Scholarships (education, vocational learning)	-	-	-	-	-	YES	YES

Source: Own compilation based on interviews, OECD (2018), documents.

Directed cooperation based on a partnership between the local authorities in North- and South-partner countries remains the most common type of decentralized cooperation (de Losada Passols, 2017). Historically, the direct bilateral cooperation between North and South partner countries was conducted in a vertical form, which was built upon the asymmetry between two parties. Against this backdrop, the vertical cooperation denoted at its early days the transfer of knowledge and transfer of resources from developed to a developing country. Deriving from the literature on the organization and management studies, the transfer of knowledge simply refers to the replication of routines and connected behaviors "coordinating the actions of multiple individuals to produce a consistent output" (Szulanski et al., 2004: 611). It, therefore, denotes the process between two parties (senders-receivers) taking place in a particular time and is conducted through selected mechanisms (Ciabuschi et al., 2011: 132). However, with the changing nature of global development cooperation, and the international debate on the aid/development effectiveness, the vertical approach to the transfer of knowledge has been replaced through the horizontal approach, explicitly referring to the concept of partnership. Though, the vertical approach to decentralized cooperation in development has not been abandoned, with some research suggesting its predominance (OECD, 2018: 34). Nevertheless, in current efforts, vertical approach prevailed mainly as in a form of fund transfer, co-financing projects in a form of direct aid transfer, direct subsidies to projects or creation of grant mechanisms for the stakeholders to apply for financial support to conduct projects. In some relatively large cases, sub-state authorities, as Flanders or Catalonia, also deliver direct funding in a form of budget support to national authorities in South-partner countries.

Although, the most recognized and common modality is a partnership, in some cases, the regional governments adopt an agency modality. Under such modality, the institutionalized agency functions as an executive body to implement the projects and programs on field. Although it is not a widespread mechanism in decentralized cooperation, and it remains an object of critique (cf. Guljarani, 2015) it is implemented by some regional authorities. In Catalonia, development policy is coordinated by the Directorate General at the Government dealing with the political dimension of development cooperation, whereas the Catalan Agency for Development Cooperation (ACCD) executes the funds allocated by the Government to particular programmes, as working in field, allocate subsidies or launching partnership with NGOs and other local authorities. Also in Flanders, until 2013 the Government implemented the development policy through the agency (FICA), yet due to the organizational reforms and

changes, the agency has been incorporated to Flanders Department of Foreign Affairs. In terms of funds allocation in a form of small-grant mechanisms supporting financially small-scale actors and stakeholders in the development, the sub-state governments tend to rely on external bodies, as foundations, networks or partnerships. The grant mechanisms and schemes are managed by the international agency Wallonie-Bruxelles International (Walloon Region), a national organization for non-governmental actors Welsh Council for Voluntary Action (Wales), the charity foundation Corra Foundation (Scotland), or the non-governmental foundation Stiftung Entwicklungs-Zusammenarbeit (Baden Württemberg).

Along with the conventional asymmetrical vertical modality, in recent years a new modality of direct cooperation gains more salience. The raising added-value of decentralized cooperation is the distinction of a horizontal approach to development cooperation as an additional component to traditional modalities. The horizontal dimension refers to transfers from sub-state authorities in developed countries to partners in developing countries based on a more equal level (OECD, 2018: 34) due to the implementation of a notion of reciprocity and mutual interests, and common benefits (Zapata Garesche, 2008: 103). As noted by the study commissioned by the European Parliament (European Parliament, 2017), a shift in paradigm occurs in decentralized cooperation from an old mechanism based on donor-recipient relations predominantly focused on financial flows at the inter-state level, but with the central role of traditional donors. A new paradigm, extended by the decentralized cooperation promotes inter-partner relations, which go beyond aid flows towards a more integrated approach supporting other than financial instruments tailored to particular partners. Critical for this horizontal shift is the partnership modality reflecting structured and mutual relations through both bilateral and multilateral channels. The partnership relates to two dimensions. First, the procedures. As confirmed in interviews, partnership refers to the cooperation which is mainly managed and implemented by actors in-partner countries, with the assistance and support from North-partner countries. In order to not taking control over the whole process, the presence of North-partner country is minimized and the initiative, management, and implementation stay at the responsibility of South-partner country. Yet, the actorness is not limited to local and regional authorities, since the non-governmental sector in-partner country plays a crucial role. The idea behind the horizontal approach to development cooperation is the transfer of non-financial resources, sharing the best practices. Second, the field of expertise. As confirmed in interviews, the idea of partnership is to launch a cooperation in areas in which North-partner countries have necessary experience and expertise (e.g.

promotion of fair trade by Wales, administrative capacity building by Flanders, healthcare by Catalonia, waste management by Baden-Württemberg, police training in Scotland). As a consequence, through the horizontal dimension sub-state governments are engaged in sharing knowledge and know-how, peer-to-peer learning, training, and professional exchanges.

Although direct cooperation is the most common form of partnership, in some cases sub-state governments lack political and economic resources to engage, therefore the development cooperation is limited to indirect cooperation. Through this modality, the sub-state governments provide only financial support for local-based NGOs and CSOs and leave the process of designing, managing and implementing particular projects with them. This modality is well-spread among the sub-state governments mainly due to the fact that local-based NGOs and CSOs were present in developing countries since the 1970s and 1980, even before the institutionalization of development policy at the local governmental level. Back in the 1980s, under the terms of so-called *new policy agenda* NGOs were seen as a market-based actor able to deliver basic services directly to local communities in a more effective way that central governments (Edwards and Hulme, 1996: 849). Although nearly all selected sub-state governments cooperate with NGOs and CSOs sectors based within their particular regions, the incentives derive from sides. For Hamburg, the political institutionalization of engagement in international cooperation was a consequence of the intention to support the Hamburg-based NGOs active since the 1980s in humanitarian and development assistance in post-conflict countries. For Wales, launching development assistance was triggered by the pressure imposed on the Welsh Government by the local-based NGOs sector engaged in development cooperation. Similarly in Wallonia, where the Council of Wallonia-Brussels for the International Cooperation (*Le Conseil Wallonie-Bruxelles de la Cooperation Internationale*, CWBCI) as established as a "unique initiative in Belgium, a response from the public authorities to demands of actors [cooperating] in indirect bilateral cooperation, [which was] born in the early 1990s" (Wallonie-Bruxelles International, 2019: 30). In terms of total volumes, the exceptionally intense cooperation through the indirect modality is exercised by the Spanish autonomous regions (cf. Pérez, 2018: 23-24).

The specific instrument of an external dimension of cooperation in development is the so-called delegated cooperation, traditionally reserved for national agencies in charge of development cooperation (de Losada Passols, 2017: 11). Although on the European ground it is still not a common instrument among regions, the practice of Flanders and Catalonia in the health sector in Mozambique is widely recognized. As confirmed in interviews, the delegated

cooperation between these two authorities derived from the necessity on the ground. As noted in literature, the current Flanders experience in areas such decentralized sexual and reproductive health research and treatment which was practiced in Mozambique, or the agriculture promotion at provincial level in South Africa would "bring useful multi-level governance insights to the joint donor policy dialogue at the national level" (Waeterloos and Renard, 2013: 339).

The external dimension of cooperation in development is also complemented by the domestic forms of intervention. Critical here are the activities such as development education or raising awareness at home, aimed at mobilizing citizens for the promotion of sustainable development, as well as the promotion of a better understanding of the current global challenges. As noted in the study by the OECD it is specifically the role of regional governments to

> contribute to raising awareness and facilitating education campaigns, fostering technical cooperation (…) and regional economic development through decentralized development cooperation>> (OECD, 2018: 30).

The specific form of domestic intervention in decentralized cooperation is the system of scholarships provided for students and professionals, which is a characteristic feature of German federal states, however not spread among other sub-state governments in Europe. The practice of hosting students and interns from developing countries (e.g. Bavarian Government hosted students from Iran and Ethiopia) traces back to the early 1950s, yet back then the internships programme were seen more a compensation policy than the regular development assistance (cf. Athenstaedt, 2011: 62). As estimated, between 1956-1960 approximately 3000 interns were trained, and about 900 scholarships were financed (Dumke, 1997: 32-34). However, with the changes to the German approach to development assistance policy over the recent decades (cf. Engel, 2002; Bücking, 1998), the issues of education become more associated with development cooperation rather than the compensation policy. Up today, the imputed student costs remains a significant contribution of German federal states to development cooperation, exceptionally exceeding other funds.

5. Towards a new type of effectiveness: an added value of sub-state governments

With very few exceptions, the performance of sub-state governments in development cooperation may only be assessed as mediocre when combined with the rigid principles and requirements of aid/development effectiveness. The overall volumes of aid are relatively low compared with those of traditional donors, and the risk of high transaction costs is high. Nevertheless, most sub-state governments perceive their engagement in development cooperation as effective. As confirmed in interviews, three aspects of the new types of development effectiveness in relation to regional governments are paramount. First, it is the mobilization of society in a donor country, corresponding with the objective to raise awareness at home. Awareness raising accompanied by the education on development represents an effort to sensitize societies by informing citizens about the challenges related to unbalanced development, and thus to mobilize public support and foster new ideas in development cooperation. Second, it is the empowerment of local administration in a partner country by supplementing traditional financial ODA with non-ODA instruments such as knowledge sharing, peer-to-peer learning, providing technical expertise on matters governed by local bodies. Third, it is the promotion of multi-stakeholder dialogue among the world's actors engaged in development assistance. The last corresponds with SDG17 aim to set up a global partnership for sustainable development. This commitment is complemented by the multi-stakeholder partnerships which "mobilize and share knowledge, expertise, technology and financial resources to support the achievement of sustainable development goals in all countries" (United Nations, 2015: 27). To meet this commitment, there is an urgency to include and promote the engagement of the private sector, civil society and local governments.

The awareness-raising and education activity in the field of SDGs remains at the center of the internal dimension in decentralized cooperation. In the spirit of the UN Agenda 2030 assumption that the scale and ambitions of SDGs require unprecedented global mobilization (United Nations, 2015), the sub-state governments through the concept of raising awareness at home aim to engage and energize citizens to promote sustainable development, as well as to better understand the current challenges. Awareness-raising activities are mainly conducted through campaigns, organized training and workshops, alignment of work programmes with SDGs or in education (Bardot et al., 2018: 15-19). They incorporate the support provided for local NGOs and CSOs. Some of them, such as the Scotland-Malawi Partnership – an umbrella organization supported by the Scottish Government – is

strengthening the links between distant regions and their citizens, with the estimation that over 2.9 million Malawians benefited from the activities of the Scotland-Malawi Partnership in the years 2017-18 (Anders, 2018). Awareness-raising starts with the assumption that the contribution to sustainable development and eradication of poverty is rooted in such values as human rights, social responsibility and "a sense of belonging to one world" (European Commission, 2012: 2). As a consequence, participation in a democratic activity which influences the social and economic situation of the most vulnerable and underprivileged individuals is regarded as an ethical imperative based on the normative assumption that developed communities have a moral duty to help the developing ones. To meet the aims of raising awareness, the European Parliament calls on the member states to elaborate and strengthen the national development education strategies (European Parliament, 2012). In light of that, the assumed role of sub-state authorities, which are the political actors closest to the people, is to create an enabling environment of strong and informed citizen engagement.

In cases such as German federal states, where education is a decentralized public policy with responsibilities for schooling decisions resting at the level of federal states, the development education inside the states is the main modality of development cooperation. The role of federal states in development education and awareness raising has been recognized by the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development, BMZ (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2018). In 2007, German ministers of education adopted a common framework of how to include education on sustainable development in school curricula, the *Cross-Curricular Framework for Global Development Education in the Context of Education for Sustainable Development* (Appelt et al., 2007). As a result of cooperation with the BMZ, it aims at providing young pupils and students in Germany with the awareness of the nature of current worldwide challenges associated with globalization processes. Having concluded that the understanding of globalization in the younger population of German society is not sufficient, the cross-curriculum critically examines the information young people receive from media (Appelt et al., 2007: 43). In addition, as noted in the Federal Strategy of 2018 (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2018), German federal states tend to support networks of NGOs engaged in development cooperation. It opens up the system of development cooperation, providing a more enabling and participatory environment. Examples of good practices are multiple. In 2010, the Bavarian Council of Ministers appointed the inter-ministerial working on Bavarian Sustainability Strategy, encompassing a

wide range of projects in sustainable development in this federal state. In Baden-Württemberg, the process of preparing guidelines in development assistance policy has been the result of consultation with citizens (State Ministry of the Baden-Württemberg, 2013). As a consequence, the issues of global development assistance are brought closer to the ground and engage a wide spectrum of citizens, in line with the goals of the UN Agenda 2030. The question of effectiveness is, therefore, transferred to the local level. A sense of knowledge or perception in society, regarding the urgency of such cooperation, may be a prerequisite of effective cooperation. From one political perspective, such awareness affects the societal support for providing development assistance policy by sub-state governments.

Whereas sub-state governments as German federal states present a model based on domestic activity[2], others expand their development assistance policy into the international level. The activity is here provided in the field of capacity building in partner institutions through the exchange, knowledge sharing, and peer learning. And, in fact, the sectors in which the sub-state governments are engaged are crucial for development, as they are education, healthcare, provision of basic services in water, sewage and waste management or human services. Moreover, local authorities, being close and accessible to citizens, are recognized as "the most responsive form of government" (Reilly, 2007: 50). In the international dimension, due to structural constraints, the activity of the sub-state governments is mainly limited to the cooperation with their counterparts abroad. Traditionally, the cooperation between particular sub-state governments stems from the historical and cultural ties linking the governments and societies. So the government of Catalonia prefers to cooperate with the bodies in Spanish-speaking regions of Latin America (cf. The Catalan Government, 2014), the cooperation between the governments of Flanders and South Africa goes back to the first post-apartheid partnership between Flemish and the South African provinces of KwaZulu-Natal and Free State (OECD, 2018: 96), and the Government of Scotland, at least rhetorically, sees its historical links with Malawi as rooted in the Scottish missionaries under David Livingstone leadership which took place over 150 years ago (The Scottish Government, 2016). Yet, behind the solidarity lies the principle of reciprocity, which ensures two-way mutually advantageous relations (cf. Irish, 2017; Skladany, 2017). At the community level, the reciprocity is regarded as the expected

[2] It is not to say that the German federal states are not involved in external projects and programmes in development assistance. However, even engaged globally, they do not concider their engagement as a form of foreign policy or international relations (Criekemans, 2010, p. 40), which are conducted exclusively by the federal government.

improvement in service delivery as a consequence of sharing the experiences and practices exercised by sub-state governments, as well as the promotion of intercultural tolerance (Bossuyt, Steenbergen, 2013: 13). Tangibly, the principle of reciprocity is expressed in the small grant schemes provided by particular sub-state governments. This facilitator modality is exercised by Wales, where the explicit requirement is that the funds the government allocates to developmental projects should clearly demonstrate the benefits for the region (cf. Wales Council for Voluntary Action, 2018). Due to the fact that development cooperation remains a reserved issue, the concept of mutual benefits "became central justifying (…) actions" provided by the Welsh Government (Wyn Jones, Royles, 2011, p. 260). Yet, the actions are very restricted and the former agreement made by the Department for International Development was required. The important feature of such an approach is that through the facilitation of participation, the Welsh Government aims at promoting also the Welsh distinctiveness expressed through the cultural aspects. It is a consensus among researchers working on external activities of sub-state governments that culture is one of the main motivations for paradiplomacy[3] (cf. Keating, 1999), specifically when combined with identity (cf. Paquin, 2004). For Wales, the formation of Government in the devolution process, and set up of Wales for Africa programme a few years later provided an opportunity to express "a reinvigorated Welsh cultural distinctiveness" (Royles, 2016, p. 231).

6. Conclusion

The international efforts towards standardizing development cooperation are going in parallel to the growing activity of sub-state governments from the European Union. Declaratively, the inclusive and participatory approach to development cooperation, triggered with the Busan Partnership after 2011, acts as a stimulus to operationalize the multi-stakeholder partnership in development. Yet, despite promising beginnings, the practice shows that the approaches diverge at different levels. The international community defines and imposes principles in order to improve the quality of so-called aid/development effectiveness while articulating the need for all potential partners in development to align with these principles. Notably, there is a lack of strategically driven interest in extending the measures of effectiveness to non-traditional donors. On the other hand, the sub-state governments develop their own understanding of effectiveness in development, which is focused on small-scale and locally attributed projects and programmes. However, there is no

[3] Paradiplomacy refers here to the external activities, including elements of foreign policy, conducted by the sub-state governments (cf. Kuznetsov, 2015).

specific model of decentralized cooperation provided by the sub-state governments. Instead, with regard to the specificity of political and legal constraints, sub-state governments differ in their approaches. In some cases, the approach to development cooperation is limited to education and awareness raising, where the main role is to inform and mobilize society in order to increase public support for such cooperation. Such an approach to development cooperation originates from the assumption of normative imperative behind the activity, and the sub-state authorities, being close to the people, perceive themselves as leaders in developmental education. In other cases, where the decentralized cooperation in development is limited to small-scale grant mechanisms, the principle of reciprocity is crucial. Lastly, for sub-state governments with well-established to institutionalized decentralized cooperation, the activity is embedded in a more comprehensive framework of external policies. In these cases, the sub-state governments aim at imitating the managerial roles taken up by the traditional donors.

Interviews

Interview 1, with the Representative of the State Ministry at the Government of Baden-Württemberg. 02.2018

Interview 2, with the Representative of the State Ministry at the Governments of Baden-Württemberg, 02.2018

Interview 3, with the Senate Chancellery in Hamburg, 02.2018

Interview 4, with the Representative of the Government of Catalonia, 05.2018

Interview 5, with the Representative of the State Office for Development Cooperation in Berlin, 05. 2018

Interview 6, with the Representative of the CIVEX at the Committee of the Regions, 07.2018

Interview 7, with the Assistants to Member of the DEVE Committee at the European Parliament, 07.2018

Interview 8, with the Member of the DEVE Committee at the European Parliament, 07.2018

Interview 9, with the Representatives of PLATFORMA, 07.2018

Interview 10, with the Representative of the Wallonie-Brussels International, 08.2018

Interview 11, with the Representative of the United Cities and Local Governments, 01.2019.

Interview 12, with the Representative of the Flemish Government, 02.2019.

Interview 13, with the Representative of the Scotland-Malawi Partnership, 02.2019.

Interview 14, with Representative of Fons Catala, 04.2019.

Interview 15, with the Representative of SEZ (Stiftung Entwicklungszusammenarbeit) Baden-Wurttemberg, 04.2019.

Interview 16, with the Representative of the Welsh Government, 05.2019.

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