

Is Local Always Better? Introductory Remarks – The Swiss Case



Building Competence. Crossing Borders.


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PhD Summer School on Local Governance, Winterthur, 6 July 2019

Structure of presentation

1. Analytical Framework of Local Service Delivery
2. Example of "Run the Business": The Swiss Federalism
3. Example of "Run the Business": Metropolitan Governance
4. Example of "Change the Business": Amalgamation Reforms in Europe
5. Preliminary Conclusions

What Do Citizens Expect from Local Government?



1 = unimportant; 5 = very important, N = 1690

European Charter of Local Self-Government

Art. 3,1: Local self-government denotes the right and the ability of local authorities, within the limits of the law, to **regulate and manage a substantial share of public affairs under their own responsibility** and in the interests of the local population.

Art. 4,3: Public responsibilities shall generally be exercised, in preference, by those authorities which are closest to the citizen. **Allocation of responsibility to another authority should weigh up the extent and nature of the task and requirements of efficiency and economy.**

Paradigms of Public Administration (since 1970s)

	Origins of Action	Steering Instrument	Virtue	Focus of Service Provision
Procedural Governance	Law	Rules	All are Treated Equal	For All
Corporate Governance	Management	Plans	Targets	Target Group
Market Governance	Competition	Contracts	Costs	Price
Network Governance	Culture	Co-Production	Flexibility	Customers

Size of Municipalities

<i>Country</i>	<i>1973</i>	<i>1993</i>	<i>2013</i>	<i>Change 1973–2013 in%</i>	<i>Mean population</i>
<i>Northern Europe</i>					
Norway	443	439	428	-3.4	11,802
Finland	483	455	320	-33.7	16,151
Sweden	464	286	290	-37.5	33,240
Denmark	275	275	98	-64.4	56,943
Iceland	224	196	74	-67.0	4,447
<i>Western Europe</i>					
Switzerland ^b	3,095	3,015	2,396	-22.6	3,163
Germany	15,009	16,043	11,197	-25.4	6,742
The Netherlands ^c	913	636	408	-55.3	41,000
Belgium	2,359	589	589	-75.0	18,593
<i>Southern Europe</i>					
Slovenia ^d	–	147	212	+44.2	10,000
Portugal	304	305	308	+1.3	34,293
Spain		8,088	8,117	+0.8	5,815
Italy ^c	8,056	8,100	8,092	+0.4	7,550
Greece	6,061	5,921	325	-94.6	33,653
<i>Eastern Europe</i>					
Poland	2,366	2,462	2,480	+4.8	15,600
<i>Total (mean)</i>	<i>3,081</i>	<i>3,130</i>	<i>2,336</i>	<i>-29.3</i>	<i>19,933</i>

^aComposition of geographical regions according to the United Nations Statistics Division


^bIn 1960, 1980, 1993, 2003 and 2013

^cIn 1970, 1980, 1995, 2003 and 2013

^dIn 1995, 2003 and 2013

^eIn 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001 and 2011—that is, the years when the Central Statistics Office conduct a census

Analytical Framework of Local Service Delivery



Arguments for decentralization

- > more effective and efficient service delivery
- > empathy for the needs of the regions
- > innovation
- > legitimation and participation is higher

Arguments against decentralization

- > disparity
- > „egoism“ of the subnational entities
- > inertia

European Local Government System

Franco-group	Anglo-group	Northern and Middle European Group
F, I, E, B, P, GR	UK, IRE	N, S, SF, DK, A, D; CH, NL
High constitutional status	Low constitutional status	High constitutional status
Strong control from above	Less control in day to day policy making	Less control from above
Low degree of local autonomy	Medium degree of local autonomy	High degree of local autonomy


Task Distribution in Europe

	<i>Education (Prim., Sec)</i>	<i>Housing</i>	<i>Health/ Hospitals</i>	<i>Welfare</i>	<i>Refuse^a</i>	<i>Leisure</i>	<i>Fire</i>
Belgium	PM	RM	PM	MP	M	RMP	M
Denmark	C	CM	C	CM	M	SCM	M
Finland	M	M	M	SM	M	M	SRM
France	N(DM)	M	S	MD	M	SDM	M
Greece	N	N	N	NM	M	NM	N
Germany	SM	SM	C	SM	M	SM	M
Ireland	N	CB	N	N	CM	M	CM
Italy	P	PM	R	RPM	PM	RPM	M
Netherlands	M	PM	PM	M	M	PM	M
Norway	CM	M	C	M	M	M	M
Portugal	N	N	N	N	NM	NM	NM
Spain	PM	M	SRM	RM	PM	NRPM	NRM
Sweden	M	M	C	M	M	MC	M
Switzerland	CAM	M	CAM	M	M	CAM	CA
UK	(CM)	M	N	NC	CM	CM	CM

Key: C = county; M = municipal; N = national; S = state; R = regions; P = provincial; D = department; CA = canton; () indicates local control but highly constrained.

^a Both collection and disposal

Revenues of Local Government in the OECD Countries



The Swiss Case



Switzerland



1 federal state

- situated in the midst of Europe
- surface 41'000 km²
- population 8.1 million
- Tasks: e. g., foreign affairs, labour law, energy, radio and television, army, health insurance



26 cantons

- Tasks: e. g., police, education, hospitals, social welfare, regional infrastructure



2212 municipalities

- Tasks: e. g., local infrastructure, sewage and garbage, culture, primary education

Historical societal cleavages in Switzerland


- > Historically important cleavages in state building and industrialisation periods:
 - Church – state
 - Centre – periphery
 - Urban areas – rural areas (industry – agriculture)
 - Left wing – right wing (labour force – property owners)

- > Contrary to other multicultural societies, Swiss parties are not based as much on linguistic or ethnic issues

State Building and Direct Democracy in the 19th century

- > In 1848, 25 tiny alpine states create the Swiss federation
- > Bottom-up state building:
 - A multicultural state for different religious beliefs, four different languages and different history of the Cantons
 - Federalism: a „weak“ central government, but „strong“ cantons
- > The historical reasons for direct democracy:
 - Control of the political elites by the people and co-decision in the most important parliamentary decisions
 - Rural communes and Cantons: Tradition of self-government

Elements of the Swiss Political System



Elements of Swiss Federalism: Role of Cantons


- > guarantee of existence
- > sovereignty guaranteed in federal constitution - only limited by the latter
- > equal rights of the cantons
- > own constitutions
- > organizational autonomy
- > financial autonomy

Elements of Swiss Federalism: Role of Cantons

- > participation in the decision-making of the Confederation: e. g., two chamber parliament, mandatory consultation, change of constitution needs double approval (people and cantons), referendum of the cantons, initiative of the cantons, service delivery of national task at level of cantons
- > intercantonal cooperation and agreements

Switzerland`s federalism is decentralized and symmetrical. It has strong cooperative elements.

The people are represented in the National Council



The cantons are represented in the Council of States



The instruments of direct democracy I

> The mandatory referendum

- Every amendment of the federal Constitution and some international treaties, proposed by the two Chambers of Parliament, are subject to a popular vote and have to get a majority of the people and the Cantons to become valid.
- At state and municipal level only – but of high importance: financial investments and taxes
- Examples: New federal Constitution (accepted 1999), membership in the European single market (rejected 1992)

> The optional referendum

- All parliamentary decisions on ordinary laws are subject to an eventual referendum: If 50'000 citizens demand a referendum within 1000 days, a popular vote on the law has to be held. It has to get the majority of the voting people to become valid.
- Examples: bilateral economic treaties with the EU (accepted in 2000), new federal law on spatial planning (accepted in 2013)


The instruments of direct democracy II

- > The popular initiative:
 - 100'000 citizens can sign a proposition for an amendment of the Constitution
 - The federal council (government) and the two chambers of parliament give propositions whether to accept or reject the popular initiative
 - In any case, the popular initiative is submitted to a popular vote
 - The popular initiative has to get a majority of the voting people and of the Cantons (the majority of each canton counting as one vote) to become part of the revised constitution
 - Examples: UN membership (accepted 2002), Abolition of the Swiss army (rejected 1989), ban of minarets (2009), fat cat initiative (accepted 2013)

Effects of direct democracy in Switzerland

- > direct democracy: highly valued by Swiss citizens
- > increased trust of citizens in political institutions
- > led to integration and positive identification with the State
- > slowed down political innovation and reforms (women's political rights, welfare state)
- > small bureaucracy, low taxes, effective State
- > permanent control of political elites

Overview of the Equalization System



Instruments: I. Resource Equalization


- > Measurement of the aggregated tax-potential (ATP) for all cantons based on...



TOTAL Income



Property



Corporate profits

- > Per capita average of three years ensures gradual change of payments
- > For the year 2019, the ATP 2016, 2017 and 2018 are considered

Instruments: II. Burden Equalization

- > Burden equalization is fully financed by the Confederation. Therefore less political discussions.
- > Two kinds of burden are relevant in Switzerland:

Geographical/ topographic :

- Height of settlements
- Steepness of terrain
- Structure of settlements
- Population density


"Compensates alpine terrains with 363 mio. CHF"

Socio-demographic:

- Welfare recipients
- Age structure
- Foreign citizens

"Compensates big centers with 363 mio. CHF"

2015: Payments of the equalization system



The Origin of the Swiss Municipalities

- ◆ **Origin** of municipalities between the 14th and 19th century
- ◆ 1874: All citizens have the same rights in all municipalities
- ◆ 1998: First mentioning of municipalities in the **Swiss Constitution** (Art. 50)

Autonomy and Right of Existence

Autonomy is the right of a municipality to decide how tasks are being done. A municipality is autonomous if the state legislation does not regulate all details.

It is not possible for a state to dissolve a municipality if there is a right of existence.

Situation of the Swiss Municipalities

- ◆ Public bodies appointed by the public law of the cantons
- ◆ Largely **autonomous**: municipalities can choose an appropriate structure, levy taxes, and independently perform tasks
- ◆ **2212** municipalities in 26 cantons. **Median: 1218 residents**. Staff: 240 FTE in the general administration, 190 FTE in enterprises, 480 FTE in primary education

Situation of the Swiss Municipalities

- ◆ **Local authorities under increasing pressure:** tasks that are increasingly complex, rise of the debt quota in some municipalities, equal legal standing of towns and less importance of community boundaries, more responsiveness is requested.


Tasks of the Swiss Municipalities

- ◆ Education: Kindergarten, Primary School, Secondary School I
- ◆ Social Welfare and Health
- ◆ Water, Electricity, and Traffic
- ◆ Planning and Construction, Sport and Culture
- ◆ Municipal Police (Fire, Roads, and Commerce)
- ◆ Citizenship
- ◆ Internal Organization, Financial Management


Autonomous and non-autonomous tasks (supposed by the cantons)

Types of IMC

Core Municipality Model




Joint Fulfillment



Types of IMC (2)

Legal Entity



IMC in Switzerland

- ◆ Swiss Municipalities work together in about 10 different tasks. We mainly see more IMC in Agglomerations.
- ◆ Associations of Municipalities are widely spread (especially in case of high sunk costs and controversial tasks). Contracts become more common.
- ◆ Most important partners are neighboring municipalities and those of the same county.

What is the difference between co-operative and non-co-operative regions?

- ◆ Co-operative municipalities act of a position of strength.
- ◆ Co-operative municipalities are centrally located.
- ◆ Residents like each other and co-operate.
- ◆ The local government acts.
- ◆ Innovation is not a buzz word. Several projects are going on.

Fiscal System in Switzerland

- ◆ Rule: No tax may be levied except where provided for by federal, cantonal or municipal statute. Taxation must be general and equal in nature, and it must be proportionate to one's ability to pay.
- ◆ Each tier of government is collecting its own taxes
- ◆ Most important taxes:
 - ◆ Natural Persons: income tax (all tiers of government), property tax (cantons and local tier), value added tax (federal tier), withholding tax and stamp duties (federal tier)
 - ◆ Corporate Taxation: profit tax (all tiers of government), capital tax (cantons and local tier)

Fiscal System in Switzerland

- ◆ Additional taxes: motor vehicle tax (cantons), inheritance tax (some cantons), gift tax (some cantons), overnight tax (some tourist areas), dog tax (some municipalities)
- ◆ User Fees play an important role: e. g. fees for water, sewage, garbage, electricity, gas, broadband access, firefighters
- ◆ Citizens submit their tax declaration form each year (in spring time) to the canton
- ◆ The canton identifies the due taxes (usually until the end of the year) and collects the money for all tiers of government (about 3 payments a year)

Fiscal System in Switzerland

- ◆ The local income and property tax are a percentage of the state tax. The percentage is being fixed by the municipalities.
- ◆ Municipalities fix the tax rate annually. This is being done by the citizens and/or the local parliament.

Revenues of Municipalities

◆ Taxes	57.6%
◆ Licences	0.6%
◆ Fees	18.0%
◆ Transfers	12.7%
◆ Financial Revenues	7.7%
◆ Revenues from Investments	3.3%
◆ Other Revenues	0.1%


Financial Planning and Budgeting

- ◆ Each municipality has a 8 year financial plan and an annual budget.
- ◆ The budget process starts in spring. Each division submits its financial needs and forecasts to the local government.
- ◆ The governments approves or rejects the budget and brings it into a finance committee.
- ◆ After approval by the local government, the citizens decide upon the budget (or the parliament).
- ◆ Depending upon the amount of an investment, single investments are being decided in a referendum.

Latest Developments

- > external factors, increased mobility, and economies of scale and scope lead to a public pressure to harmonize service delivery
- > decreasing consensus on large differences in tax rates
- > metropolitan governance of higher importance: new forms of multilevel governance needed and created

Evaluation of the Swiss System based upon Scharpf's classification




Coping with the crisis: do Swiss institutions foster or hamper it?


- > indicators show that Switzerland has been less hard-hit by the crisis than other nations
- > rather due to long-term and structural factors than “better” crisis management
- > economic factors: e. g. professional skills of workers, flexibility and innovation of enterprises
- > political factors: Swiss power-sharing gives voice to all minorities and has guaranteed political stability. It has also kept the state rather small, and Swiss citizens consider public services of high quality
- > but some changes only under heavy external pressure (e. g. relationship with EU, banking policies)

Metropolitan Areas in Europe

- Metropolitan Area = Metropolitan areas include one or more urban areas, as well as satellite cities, towns and intervening rural areas that are socioeconomically tied to the urban core, typically measured by commuting patterns
- 99 major metropolitan areas in Europe (more than 1 million residents). 305 metropolitan areas with more than 200 000 residents (EUROSTAT).
- 1/3 live in the historical urban core.
- Europe has twice as many metropolitan areas as the US. Population is also higher (207 vs.173 million). But more Americans live in urban areas (55 vs. 40 percent).



Involved Jurisdictions in Metropolitan Areas



Three (Historical) Strategies of Resolving Challenges of Metropolitan Areas

Challenges (e. g.):

- disparities, heterogeneous developments
- bureaucratic burdens for citizens and companies (red tape)
- no use of economies of scale and scope, free rider problems
- political failures


Strategies:

- Consolidation (Welfare Economics)
- Fragmentation (Public Choice)
- New Regionalism (Soft Institutions)


Trends in Metropolitan Governance

- Intensified Competition between Metropolitan Areas
- Balance between Variable and Stable Geometry
- Success Factor lies in Smart Networks of Public and Private Actors – Primate of Politics
- Role of Legislation: Umbrella Regulation (Institutions, Harmonization where Necessary), Incentives


Example for binding soft institution: "Unification Model"



Example for non-binding soft institution: «Platform Model»




Expected Development of Governance in Metropolitan Areas



N=399-535.

Possible Repositioning of Public Tasks



Amalgamation Strategies in Europe

<i>Amalgamation strategy</i>	<i>Countries</i>
Top-down strategy (comprehensive)	Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, the Netherlands
Top-down strategy (incremental)	Spain, Norway
Mixed strategy	Belgium, Germany (some Länder), Switzerland (some cantons)
Bottom-up strategy	Switzerland (some cantons)
No amalgamation strategy	Germany (some Länder), Italy, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland (some cantons)
Fragmentation strategy	Poland, Slovenia

Objectives of Amalgamation Reforms

<i>Objectives</i>	<i>Countries</i>		
	<i>No importance^a</i>	<i>Medium importance</i>	<i>High importance</i>
<i>Improving input</i> Efficiency (economies of scale, economies of scope)			Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland
More specialized staff	Denmark, Italy	Belgium, Finland, Iceland, Greece, Switzerland	
<i>Improving output</i> Improving service quality		Denmark	Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland
<i>Improving room for maneuvering</i> Evolution/ Delegation of powers	Denmark	Iceland, Italy, Switzerland	Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden
Democratization/ Participation/ Accountability	Denmark, Germany, Iceland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland	Belgium, Italy	Greece, Norway

^aThe experts assessed the various items on a scale from 1 (not important) to 5 (important). We have clustered the answers 1 and 2 as “No Importance,” 3 as “Medium Importance,” and 4 and 5 as “High Importance.”

Patterns of Conflict

<i>Conflicts</i>	<i>Countries</i>		
	<i>No importance</i>	<i>Medium importance</i>	<i>High importance</i>
Central-Local		Italy, Switzerland	Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden
Rich-Poor	Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Sweden	Finland, Germany	The Netherlands, Switzerland
Large-Small	Denmark, Italy, Sweden	Finland	Belgium, Germany, Greece, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland
Left-Right	Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Switzerland	Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway	Belgium, Greece, Sweden
Technocracy-Politics	Belgium, Denmark, Sweden	Germany, Switzerland	Finland, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Norway

Problems During The Amalgamation Process

<i>Implementation problems</i>	<i>Countries</i>		
	<i>No importance</i>	<i>Medium importance</i>	<i>High importance</i>
Strong opposition of politicians	Sweden	Italy, Switzerland	Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway
Strong opposition of employees	Belgium, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Sweden		Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland
Insufficient resources for reform implementation	Belgium, Norway, Sweden	Finland, Germany, Iceland, Switzerland	Greece, Italy, the Netherlands
No time to prepare the implementation	Belgium, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland	Finland, Germany, Greece	Iceland, the Netherlands
Other reform projects at the same time	Belgium, Greece, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland	Germany, Italy	Finland, the Netherlands
Unclear/Inconsistent reform objectives	Belgium, Greece, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland	Germany, Italy	Finland

Outcome of Amalgamations

<i>Outcome</i>	<i>Countries</i>		
	<i>No importance</i>	<i>Medium importance</i>	<i>High importance</i>
<i>Improving input</i> Cost savings		Finland, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland	Belgium, Germany, Greece, Iceland
<i>Improved output</i> Improved professional quality	Italy		Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Sweden, Switzerland
Improved legal correctness	Finland, Germany, Italy, Switzerland	Iceland, Sweden	Belgium, Greece
Improved citizen orientation	Finland, Germany, Sweden	Belgium, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Switzerland	
More equal treatment of citizens	Sweden	Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Switzerland	Belgium, Iceland
<i>Room for maneuvering</i> Strengthened local autonomy		Belgium, Finland, Germany, Iceland	Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland
Increased influence of the superordinate tier of government	Iceland, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland	Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands	
Strengthened local mayors/executives		Finland, Iceland, Italy, Switzerland	Belgium, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Sweden
Strengthened local citizenship	Finland, Germany, Iceland, the Netherlands, Sweden	Greece, Italy, Switzerland	Belgium

Significant Correlations


<i>Correlation</i>		<i>Measure of association (Spearman's Rho)</i>
<i>Objectives</i>	<i>Strategies</i>	
No significant correlation		
<i>Strategies</i>	<i>Patterns of conflict</i>	
Reform initiative (1 = bottom-up; 5 = top-down)	Reform accepted by the public (1 = not at all; 5 = widely accepted)	-0.635*
Scope of reforms (1 = incremental; 5 = comprehensive)	Rich-Poor (1 = not important at all; 5 = very important)	-0.779**
Convincing/Gaining support (1 = incentives/inclusion; 5 = threats/exclusion)	Left-Right (1 = not important at all; 5 = very important)	0.776**
<i>Strategies</i>	<i>Outcome</i>	
Reform initiative (1 = bottom-up; 5 = top-down)	Improved citizen orientation (1 = not at all; 5 = very important)	-0.760*
Scope of reforms (1 = incremental; 5 = comprehensive)	Improved legal correctness (1 = not at all; 5 = very important)	0.883**
Voluntariness of reform (1 = yes; 5 = no)	Strengthened local mayors/ executives (1 = not at all; 5 = very important)	0.778*
<i>Patterns of conflict</i>	<i>Outcome</i>	
Technocracy-Politics (1 = not important at all; 5 = very important)	Explicit reform goals achieved (1 = not at all; 5 = very important)	-0.709*
Small-Large (1 = not important at all; 5 = very important)	Cost savings (1 = not at all; 5 = very important)	0.808*
Central-Local (1 = not important at all; 5 = very important)	Strengthened local mayors/ executives (1 = not at all; 5 = very important)	0.742*

Note: Spearman's Rho; N=11; * $p < 0.05$. ** $p < 0.01$

Role of Mayors and Top Civil Servants

- > Over the past decades, municipalities have been subject to reform in many European countries. Mayors/Local Politicians play a crucial role because they must usually approve reforms or are responsible for their implementation.
- > It is therefore interesting to discover more about the role of local executive politicians in these reform processes.
- > While there is much literature on local government reforms and on the role of the local executive authority in general, studies which investigate the connection between the two are scarce.
- > The study investigates whether the reform agenda of a municipality is rather influenced by the institutional setting or the personal attributes of local politicians.

Theoretical Framing: Upper Echelon Theory



Hypotheses

> Hypothesis 1:

Antecedents (institutional settings), within which the local politicians act, have an influence on the municipalities' reform activities.

> Hypothesis 2:

Values and Cognitive Bases (personal attributes) of local politicians have an influence on the municipalities' reform activities.

Independent Variables

Institutional setting

- > Population size
- > Language region
- > Financial situation

Attributes of local leaders

- > Age
- > Level of education
- > Gender
- > Position in left-right dimension

Dependent Variables

Internal municipal reform

- > Public Management Reforms

Reforms overlapping municipalities

- > Increase in Intermunicipal Cooperation
- > Amalgamation Reforms

Methodology

- > As object of research, the Swiss municipalities were chosen, where local politics is mainly made by local politicians and reforms are mostly implemented on a voluntary basis.
- > Two large-scale surveys:
 - Survey of all local politicians in Switzerland in 2017 (present example: universe of 15,380 politicians; response rate of 52.7%).
 - Survey of all local secretaries (i. e. top bureaucrats in the municipalities) in Switzerland in 2017 (present sample: universe of 2,631 municipalities; response rate of 57.7%).
 - The data sets are being merged (cases in which politicians and municipalities participated) (present sample: 4700).

Results of Regression Analysis

Results of Regression Analysis: Influence of Institutional Settings and Attributes of Local Politicians on the Implementation of Local Government Reforms

	NPM reforms			Increase in IMC			Amalgamation		
	B	SE	β	B	SE	Odds ratio	B	SE	Odds ratio
<i>Institutional Setting</i>									
Constant	2.212	.697		-.355	.518		-3.815	.907	
Population size	.000	.000	.314***	.000***	.000	1.000	.000*	.000	1.000
Language region: - German vs. French	-2.426	.176	-.263***	-.345**	.117	.708	.433*	.214	1.541
- German vs. Italian	-1.889	.331	-.110***	.116	.238	1.123	2.133***	.282	8.439
Financial situation	.008	.070	.002	.121*	.049	1.129	.209*	.090	1.233
<i>Attributes of Local Politicians</i>									
Age	.722	.104	.130***	.093	.074	1.098	.007	.129	1.007
Level of education	.242	.055	.088***	.044	.039	1.045	-.027	.071	.973
Gender	.006	.005	.022	.086	.059	1.090	.201*	.101	1.222
Position in dimension left-right	-.132	.052	-.047*	.016	.037	1.016	-.008	.065	.992
R ²				.246					
R ² (Cox & Snell)							.035		
R ² (Nagelkerke)							.052		

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Preliminary Conclusions

- > Several influencing factors could be found for each of the two hypotheses
- > Size of the municipalities is relevant for whether internal managerial reforms are implemented
- > For the internal municipal reforms as well as reforms overlapping municipalities, the language region is relevant ('imitation' according to March/Olsen 1989)
- > The personal attribute variables are more important for the internal municipal reform than the two reforms overlapping municipalities
- > Next steps: More Variables, Structural Equation Model, Analysis of 2017 Data

Triggers and Success of Reforms at Local Tier of Government in Switzerland

Triggers	Success of the projects
Social change (variation and selection, evolution)	0.183*
Evaluation (public choice, problem solving)	0.327**
Trial and error (experimental learning)	-0.424**
Conflict (political actors promote their self-interest)	-0.203*
Contagion, copying	n.s.
New persons, new solutions	n.s.
n	141-157

Do Municipalities Converge?

- ◆ H1: Municipalities become more similar (one best way, variation and selection)
- ◆ H2: Municipalities are not becoming more similar (path-dependency)
- ◆ H3: Convergence/divergence within sub-groups
- ◆ H4: Uniform development