Global Entry: Reconceptualizing Multinational Investments as Two-Sided Matches Between Governments and Firms
Multinational investment decisions are often viewed solely from the perspective of companies, but governments also play a crucial role. In her research, Prof. Sinziana Dorobantu demonstrates how a two-sided framework takes into account the goals of both companies and governments.
Strategy research often portrays multinational investment decisions as unilateral choices made solely by multinational firms. However, this perspective overlooks the significant role that governments play in approving such investments across various industries and countries.
In Prof. Sinziana Dorobantu’s research paper, they propose a theoretical framework that redefines multinational investment as a two-sided match: it involves both a multinational firm interested in a specific location and a government interested in attracting that firm's investment.
The two-sided framework considers the strategic objectives of both multinational firms and governments, which can either encourage or deter firms from entering particular markets. Secondly it incorporates the interdependencies of competition among firms for prime investment locations and vice versa governments for top firms.
Empirically, statistical simulations to compare the explanatory power of matching models versus unilateral choice models were utilized. With the goal on demonstrating that matching models provide superior explanations in the global electricity generation industry.
Prof. Sinziana Dorobantu is an Associate Professor of Management and Organization at New York University Stern School of Business. Her research covers international business, strategic management, and political economy. Her work explores multinational firms' strategies for engaging stakeholders and the international expansion of both state-owned and private firms in infrastructure industries.